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This Article is one of a series of explorations of modern standing doctrines. The other
pieces are: (1) Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary
Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1701
(2008) [hereinafter Mank, State Standing]; (2) Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Future
Generations: Does Massachusetts v. EPA Open Standing for Generations to Come?, 34 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Mank, Standing and Future Generations]; (3) Bradford
Mank, Standing and Statistical Persons: A Risk-Based Approach to Standing, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q.
665 (2009); (4) Bradford Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute Rejects Probabilistic
Standing, but a “Realistic Threat” of Harm Is a Better Standing Test, 40 ENVTL. L. 89 (2010); (5)
Bradford Mank, Revisiting the Lyons Den: Summers v. Earth Island Institute’s Misuse of
Lyons’s “Realistic Threat” of Harm Standing Test, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J 837 (2010); (6) Bradford C.
Mank, Summers v. Earth Island Institute: Its Implications for Future Standing Decisions, 40
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After Summers, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (2012); (9) Bradford C. Mank, Reading the
Standing Tea Leaves in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 543
(2012); (10) Bradford C. Mank, Judge Posner’s “Practical” Theory of Standing: Closer to Justice
Breyer’s Approach to Standing than to Justice Scalia’s, 50 HOUSTON L. REV. 71 (2012); (11)
Bradford C. Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases: Traceable Standing
Causation Does Not Require Proximate Causation, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 869 (2012); (12)
Bradford C. Mank, Is Prudential Standing Jurisdictional?, 64 CASE W. L. REV. 413 (2013); (13)
Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or Three Competing Philosophies of
Standing Law?, 81 TENN. L. REV. 211 (2014) [hereinafter Mank, Two or Three]; (14)
Bradford C. Mank, No Article III Standing for Private Plaintiffs Challenging State Greenhouse Gas
Regulations: The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Washington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 63
AM. U. L. REV. 1525 (2014); (15) Bradford C. Mank, Does United States v. Windsor (the
DOMA Case) Open the Door to Congressional Standing Rights?, 76 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2014).
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ABSTRACT
In data breach cases, the plaintiff typically alleges that the defendant used inadequate computer security to protect the plaintiff’s personal data. In most, but not all cases, the plaintiff
cannot prove that a hacker or thief has actually used or sold the data to the plaintiff’s detriment.
In most cases, a plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s failure to protect his personal data has
caused him damages by increasing his risk of suffering actual identity theft in the future and
therefore imposed costs on the plaintiff when he reasonably takes measures to prevent future
unauthorized third-party data access by purchasing credit monitoring services.
In data breach cases, the lower federal courts have split on the question of whether the
plaintiffs meet Article III standing requirements for injury and causation. In its 2013 decision
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court, in a case involving alleged electronic
surveillance by the U.S. government’s National Security Agency, declared that a plaintiff alleging
that it will suffer future injuries from a defendant’s allegedly improper conduct must show that
such injuries are “certainly impending.” Since the Clapper decision, a majority of the lower
federal courts addressing “lost data” or potential identity theft cases in which there is no proof of
actual misuse or fraud have held that plaintiffs lack standing to sue the party who failed to
protect their data. But a significant minority of lower court decisions have disagreed that the
Clapper decision requires denial of standing in data breach cases in which there is no proof of
present harm, because a footnote in Clapper acknowledged that the Court had sometimes used a
less strict “substantial risk” test when plaintiffs alleged that a defendant’s actions increase their
risk of future harm.
Demonstrating its concern for digital privacy, the Court in Riley v. California recently
required police to obtain a Fourth Amendment warrant before examining the digital data on the
cell phones of arrested suspects. It would be easy for courts to distinguish the government’s seizure
of digital data from arrestees in Riley from a third party’s hacking of data from a retailer or
employer. The Riley decision involves Fourth Amendment warrant issues that are not relevant to
private data breach cases. Yet in both cell phone seizure cases and data breach cases, there is the
common concern that vast amounts of personal data are often at stake. The new privacy concerns in a digital age should lead the Supreme Court to take a broader view of standing in data
breach cases. It is also possible that the Court will follow the Seventh Circuit’s Remijas decision
to distinguish between cases where there is only a possible risk of theft from those where actual
harm has occurred to some plaintiffs.

INTRODUCTION
Because Article III of the Constitution limits the authority of federal
judges to deciding “Cases” and “Controversies,”1 the U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted Article III to impose mandatory standing requirements that
require each plaintiff in federal court to demonstrate that he has suffered a
concrete injury that is fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant and
redressable by a favorable judgment of a federal court.2 The injury and
traceable causation prongs of the Article III standing test have raised
problems for plaintiffs in “lost data,” “data breach,” or potential “identity
theft” cases in which plaintiffs allege damages when computer hackers or
thieves of physical property such as laptops or hard drives breach a defendant’s computer system or network that contains the plaintiff’s personal
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also infra Part I.
2 See infra Part I.
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information such as birth dates or Social Security numbers.3 Data breach
cases can involve tens of millions of Americans, as in the Target retail breach,
which led to sixty-eight class action lawsuits4 in twenty-one states and the District of Columbia in less than one month,5 and, therefore these cases raise
important policy concerns.6
In data breach cases, the plaintiff typically alleges that the defendant
used inadequate computer security to protect the plaintiff’s personal data
from being accessed by third party hackers or thieves.7 In most, but not all
cases, the plaintiff cannot prove that a hacker or thief has actually used or
sold the data to the plaintiff’s detriment.8 In most cases, a plaintiff alleges
that the defendant’s failure to protect his personal data has caused him damages by increasing his risk of suffering actual identity theft in the future and
therefore imposed costs on the plaintiff when he reasonably takes measures
3 See infra Part III. See generally Adam Lamparello, Online Data Breaches, Standing, and
the Third-Party Doctrine, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 119, 120–21, 127–28 (arguing that
courts should reject third-party doctrine that citizens surrender any privacy rights voluntarily conveyed to a third party, and allow standing in data breach cases); Lexi Rubow, Note,
Standing in the Way of Privacy Protections: The Argument for a Relaxed Article III Standing Requirement for Constitutional and Statutory Causes of Action, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1007, 1040–42
(2014) (advocating broader standing in data breach cases).
4 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (setting forth rules for certifying class actions in federal courts); Caroline C. Cease, Note, Giving Out Your Number: A Look at the Current State of
Data Breach Litigation, 66 ALA. L. REV. 395, 414–19 (2014) (discussing issues involving data
breach plaintiffs seeking class certification pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23).
Named plaintiffs in a class action must prove Article III standing, but lower courts have
divided over whether absent class members also have to demonstrate standing. See generally
Theane Evangelis & Bradley J. Hamburger, Article III Standing and Absent Class Members, 64
EMORY L.J. 383 (2014). A full discussion of the standing of class members is beyond the
scope of this Article.
5 Joel Schectman, Target Faces Nearly 70 Lawsuits over Breach, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15,
2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/01/15/target-faces-nearly-70-lawsuits-over-breach/.
6 See John L. Jacobus & Benjamin B. Watson, Clapper v. Amnesty International and
Data Privacy Litigation: Is a Change to the Law “Certainly Impending”?, 21 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1,
1 (2014) (“While Target originally estimated that the security breach affected 40 million of
its customers, a subsequent investigation revealed that anywhere from 70 to 110 million
people—almost one in three Americans—may have had their sensitive payment information stolen.”); Rachael M. Peters, Note, So You’ve Been Notified, Now What? The Problem with
Current Data-Breach Notification Laws, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1171, 1173–74 (2014) (discussing data
breach cases involving millions of customers each at Target, Home Depot, and JP Morgan
Chase).
7 See Cease, supra note 4, at 399 (discussing cases “in which the plaintiffs’ information
has been accessed but that information has not been used to open bank accounts, make
unauthorized purchases, or otherwise harm the plaintiffs. However, these plaintiffs typically claim that they have been harmed in other ways: incurring costs for credit-monitoring
services, paying the costs of cancelling and receiving new bank cards, suffering loss of
reward points from cancelled cards, and enduring general anxiety that their information
will be used in the future to make unauthorized purchases.” (footnote omitted)); see also
infra Part III.
8 See infra Part III; see also Cease, supra note 4, at 399–404.
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to prevent future unauthorized third-party data access by purchasing credit
monitoring services.9 However, if a plaintiff’s credit cards or bank accounts
have actually been misused by thieves because of a data breach, then there is
a much stronger argument that the plaintiff has demonstrated standing
injury and causation.10
Currently, there is no comprehensive federal statute addressing data
breach issues so plaintiffs have invoked a variety of state and federal laws to
sue defendant companies that have failed to protect the plaintiffs’ data.11
For example, some of the cases are brought under state common law negligence or breach of contract theories, and others pursuant to federal statutes
such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).12 A related issue arises where
a defendant has allegedly falsely reported information about a plaintiff to
third parties in violation of various federal statutes, but it is difficult to measure the actual harm to the plaintiff.13
9 See Cease, supra note 4, at 399–404; infra Part III.
10 See Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that a
plaintiff’s allegation that a third party opened bank accounts in the plaintiff’s name and
caused financial losses is a sufficient injury in fact for Article III standing); Lambert v.
Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2008) (concluding that a plaintiff’s “actual financial
injuries are sufficient to meet the injury-in-fact requirement” for Article III standing);
Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 665 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (holding the plaintiff had
standing where his credit cards or bank accounts had actually been misused by thieves
because of a data breach for which defendant had responsibility); In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1159 (D. Minn. 2014) (same); Cease,
supra note 4, at 398–99 (discussing Sixth and Eleventh Circuit decisions holding that plaintiffs have Article III standing if a data breach results in financial charges against a plaintiff);
Peters, supra note 6, at 1188 (discussing Resnick). Courts have divided over standing when
a defendant has reimbursed all direct costs of a financial misuse of stolen information, but
plaintiffs allege that they have suffered serious indirect or incidental costs from significant
time spent correcting fraudulent charges, or where they could not access their credit or
bank accounts for a period of time as a result of a breach. Compare Remijas v. Neiman
Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692–97 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding 9200 plaintiffs who
were later reimbursed for fraudulent charges had alleged an adequate injury in fact for
standing where they alleged that they had “suffered the aggravation and loss of value of the
time needed to set things straight, to reset payment associations after credit card numbers
[were] changed, and to pursue relief for unauthorized charges”), with Burton v. MAPCO
Express, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1284–85 (N.D. Ala. 2014) (concluding the plaintiff must
incur actual unreimbursed damages to have either standing or a ripe claim). See also Robert D. Fram et al., Standing in Data Breach Cases: A Review of Recent Trends, 84 U.S.L.W.
(BNA) 488 (Oct. 13, 2015) (discussing Remijas and citing Burton).
11 See Peters, supra note 6, at 1177–83 (discussing several federal and state statutes
relevant to victims of data breaches).
12 See Cease, supra note 4, at 405–13 (discussing state common law and statutory
claims in data breach cases); Peters, supra note 6, at 1177–87, 1194 (observing that only
fourteen states provide a private cause of action for data breaches, that there is no comprehensive federal statute giving a private right of action for data breaches, and, therefore,
data breach plaintiffs in most states must bring either common law actions or more indirect state or federal statutory claims); infra Part III.
13 See infra Part III.
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In data breach cases, and also in false reporting cases, the lower federal
courts have split on the question of standing.14 In its 2013 decision Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA,15 the Supreme Court, in a case involving alleged
electronic surveillance by the U.S. government’s National Security Agency,
declared that a plaintiff alleging that it will suffer future injuries from a
defendant’s allegedly improper conduct must show that such injuries are
“certainly impending.”16 Since the Clapper decision, a majority of the lower
federal courts addressing “lost data” or potential identity theft cases in which
there is no proof of actual misuse or fraud have held that plaintiffs lack standing to sue the party who failed to protect their data.17 But a significant
minority of lower court decisions have disagreed that the Clapper decision
requires denial of standing in all data breach cases, because a footnote in
Clapper acknowledged that the Court had sometimes used a less strict “substantial risk” test when plaintiffs alleged that a defendant’s actions increase
their risk of future harm.18 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit in its 2015
decision Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, distinguished Clapper because
a significant number of the plaintiffs had suffered actual fraud or other
harms, on the grounds that in such cases other plaintiffs are at increased risk
compared to cases where no one has suffered an actual theft of property.19
In light of the continuing split in the circuits regarding Article III standing in data breach and fraudulent reporting cases, the Supreme Court will
eventually have to address this important question.20 Predicting how the
Court will resolve the issue is difficult because the Court’s standing precedents could plausibly support either position.21 It is possible that the Court’s
decision will depend on how personally vulnerable some of the Justices feel
to the threat of identity theft.22 Alternatively, the Court may follow the Seventh Circuit’s Remijas decision to distinguish cases where there is only a possi-

14 See infra Part III.
15 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
16 Id. at 1143 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra Part II.
17 See infra Part III.
18 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5; see also infra Parts II, III.
19 See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692–94 (7th Cir. 2015); John
Biglow, Note, It Stands to Reason: An Argument for Article III Standing Based on the Threat of
Future Harm in Data Breach Litigation, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 943, 955–57, 967–69,
972–73, 975 (2016) (discussing and praising the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Remijas);
Clara Kim, Note, Granting Standing in Data Breach Cases: The Seventh Circuit Paves the Way
Towards a Solution to the Increasingly Pervasive Data Breach Problem, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
544, 573–77 (same); Rajesh De et al., The Evolution of Data Breach Litigation in the United
States: What’s Happening and What’s Ahead, 84 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 710 (Nov. 24, 2015) (arguing
that some courts have distinguished Clapper in data breach suits where some plaintiffs have
suffered actual injuries); infra Section III.D.
20 See infra Part III, Conclusion.
21 See infra Part III, Conclusion.
22 See infra Conclusion.
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ble risk of theft from those where actual harm has occurred to some
plaintiffs.23
Demonstrating its concern for digital privacy, the Court recently
required police to obtain a Fourth Amendment warrant before examining
the digital data on the cell phones of arrested suspects in Riley v. California.24
It would be easy for courts to distinguish the government’s seizure of digital
data from arrestees in Riley from a third party’s hacking of data from a
retailer or employer.25 The Riley decision involves Fourth Amendment warrant issues that are not relevant to private data breach cases against companies that failed to protect data.26 However, in both cell phone seizure cases
and data breach cases, there is a similar policy concern that huge amounts of
personal data are often at risk.27 The Riley decision’s recognition of new
privacy concerns in a digital era should lead the Supreme Court to take a
broader view of standing in data breach cases.28
Part I explains the basic principles of constitutional Article III standing.29 Part II discusses how the recent Clapper and Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus30 decisions arguably affect when plaintiffs have Article III standing
based on future injuries.31 Part III examines the split in the circuits regarding Article III standing in data breach and fraudulent reporting cases and the
impact of the Clapper and Susan B. Anthony decisions on how lower federal
courts decide standing.32 The Conclusion discusses whether the Court’s
recent Fourth Amendment decision protecting the privacy of cell phone data
might have implications in standing cases involving data breaches.33
I.

INTRODUCTION

TO

CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE III STANDING

While the Constitution does not explicitly mandate that each and every
plaintiff demonstrate “standing” to file suit in federal courts, the Supreme
Court has inferred from Article III’s limitation of judicial decisions to “Cases”
and “Controversies” that federal courts must impose standing requirements
to establish that a plaintiff has a genuine interest and a stake in the outcome
23 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 692–97; Biglow, supra note 19, at 972–73, 975 (arguing
courts should follow the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Remijas, which found Article III
standing where some persons had already been harmed by a data breach and remaining
plaintiffs were therefore at a significantly increased risk of harm); infra Section III.D.
24 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014); see infra Conclusion.
25 See infra Conclusion.
26 See infra Conclusion.
27 See infra Conclusion.
28 See infra Conclusion.
29 See infra Part I. The discussion of standing in Part I relies upon my earlier standing
articles. See supra note *.
30 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
31 See infra Part II.
32 See infra Part III.
33 See infra Conclusion.
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of a case.34 For a federal court to have jurisdiction over a claim, at least one
plaintiff must prove it has standing for each form of relief sought.35 Federal
courts must dismiss a case if no plaintiff meets constitutional Article III standing requirements.36
Standing requirements are based upon fundamental constitutional principles. Standing doctrine prohibits unconstitutional advisory opinions.37
Furthermore, standing requirements are congruent with separation of powers principles defining the division of powers between the judiciary and political branches of government so that the “Federal Judiciary respects ‘the
proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society.’ ”38 Various members of the Supreme Court have disagreed, however,
34 The constitutional standing requirements are derived from Article III, Section 2,
which provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—[between a State and Citizens of another
State;—] between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, [and between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.]
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (footnote omitted); see also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547
U.S. 332, 340–41 (2006) (explaining why the Supreme Court infers that Article III’s case
and controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations and clarifying that “[i]f a
dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it”); Stark
v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (stating that Article III grants courts the power to
“adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of infringement of individual rights
whether by unlawful action of private persons or by the exertion of unauthorized administrative power”). See generally Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1036–38 (2009) (discussing a scholarly debate on
whether the framers intended the Constitution to require standing to sue).
35 See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 352 (confirming that “a plaintiff must demonstrate
standing separately for each form of relief sought” (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted))); Mank, State Standing, supra note *, at 1710.
36 See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340–41 (emphasizing the importance of the case or
controversy requirement); Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 (adding that courts have an
affirmative duty at the outset of the litigation to ensure that litigants satisfy all Article III
standing requirements).
37 See Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (“Article III of the Constitution
restricts the power of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ Accordingly, ‘[t]o
invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened
with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.’ Federal courts may not ‘decide questions that cannot affect the rights of
litigants in the case before them’ or give ‘opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Lewis v.
Cont’l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990))).
38 DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984), partially abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Con-
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regarding the degree to which separation of powers principles limit Congress’s authority to authorize standing to sue in federal courts for privatecitizen suits challenging executive branch under- or non-enforcement of congressional requirements that are arguably mandated by statute.39
The Supreme Court has established a three-part test for constitutional
Article III standing that requires a plaintiff to show that: (1) she has “suffered
an injury in fact,” which is (a) “concrete and particularized”40 and (b) “actual
or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ ”;41 (2) “there [is] a causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury
has to be ‘fairly . . . trace[able]42 to the challenged action of the defendant,
and not . . . th[e] result[ ] [of] the independent action of some third party
not before the court’ ”;43 and (3) “it [is] ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ ”44 The
trol Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014)); see also Mank, Standing and Future Generations, supra note *, at 26.
39 Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–78 (1992) (concluding
that Articles II and III of the Constitution limit Congress’s authority to authorize citizen
suits by any person lacking a concrete injury, and citing several recent Supreme Court
decisions for support), with id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none existed before”), and id. at 602
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “principal effect” of the majority’s approach to
standing was “to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the expense—not of the
courts—but of Congress, from which that power originates and emanates”). See generally
Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 496 (2008) (suggesting the
“disagreement” is “[u]nsurprising[ ]” and arguing that courts should not use standing doctrine as “a backdoor way to limit Congress’s legislative power”).
40 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Allen, 468 U.S. at
756).
41 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 155 (1990)).
42 The Lexmark decision explained the distinction between the standing requirement
of fairly traceable causation and the ultimate question of proving proximate causation on
the merits as follows:
Proximate causation is not a requirement of Article III standing, which
requires only that the plaintiff’s injury be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct. Like the zone-of-interests test, it is an element of the cause of action under
the statute, and so is subject to the rule that “the absence of a valid (as opposed to
arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.” But like
any other element of a cause of action, it must be adequately alleged at the pleading stage in order for the case to proceed. If a plaintiff’s allegations, taken as
true, are insufficient to establish proximate causation, then the complaint must
be dismissed; if they are sufficient, then the plaintiff is entitled to an opportunity
to prove them.
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1391 n.6 (2014)
(citations omitted) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998))
(citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009)).
43 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (second, third, fourth, fifth, and seventh alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)).
44 Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
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plaintiff bears the burden of proving all three elements of constitutional Article III standing.45
In several cases, but not every decision, the Court has established a
standing principle that a party “generally must assert his own legal rights and
interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of
third parties.”46 The Court has explained its third-party standing doctrine as
assuming that “the party with the right has the appropriate incentive to challenge (or not challenge) governmental action and to do so with the necessary zeal and appropriate presentation,” but that third parties are more likely
to raise “abstract questions of wide public significance” that are better
addressed by “other governmental institutions” than the federal courts.47
The Court has allowed exceptions to the general limitation on third-party
standing in some constitutional areas involving fundamental rights.48 However, the Court has restricted those exceptions
by requiring that a party seeking third-party standing make two additional
showings. First, we have asked whether the party asserting the right has a
“close” relationship with the person who possesses the right. Second, we
have considered whether there is a “hindrance” to the possessor’s ability to
protect his own interests.49

In cases involving First Amendment and other critical constitutional
rights, the Court has been more willing to acknowledge third-party suits, but
in non-constitutional areas of law, the Court has been much less willing to do
so.50
The Court’s limitation of third-party suits to important constitutional
questions helps to explain a somewhat related principle that parties that voluntarily transfer information to another party generally cannot sue for invasion of privacy if the receiving party knowingly or inadvertently conveys that
45 See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (stating that parties
asserting federal jurisdiction must “carry the burden of establishing their standing under
Article III”); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the
burden of establishing these elements.”); Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing Doctrine
Abolished or Waiting for a Comeback?: Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 213, 220 (2015) (“The plaintiff bears the burden of proof
for all three prongs of constitutional Article III standing.”).
46 Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975), partially abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct.
1377 (2014)); see also Mank, supra note 45, at 258.
47 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975), partially abrogated by Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377); see also Mank,
supra note 45, at 258.
48 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 129–30; Brandon L. Garrett, The Constitutional Standing of Corporations, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 147–49 (2014); Mank, supra note 45, at 258. See generally
Brian Charles Lea, The Merits of Third Party Standing, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 277,
287–302 (2015) (discussing history of third-party standing doctrine).
49 Kowalski, 543 U.S. at 130 (citations omitted) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,
411 (1991)); Garrett, supra note 48, at 147–49; Mank, supra note 45, at 258.
50 Mank, supra note 45, at 258–61 (citing several cases); see Lea, supra note 48, at
296–302 (same).
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information to third parties, including hackers.51 In Katz v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable government searches applies only if a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information seized by the government.52 The Katz
decision’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” principle has been applied
outside its original Fourth Amendment context to deny privacy rights to
plaintiffs who voluntarily convey information to another party that is accessed
by a third party.53 If a plaintiff lacks a privacy expectation in unlawfully
accessed data, arguably there is no injury from the release of the information
itself in the absence of actual financial harm, or from possible future injuries
from misuse of that information.54 However, the Conclusion will argue that
traditional limitations on privacy doctrines should be revised in an online era
where personal data is readily accessible to unwanted third parties, including
hackers or the government.55
II. CLAPPER, “SUBSTANTIAL RISK,”

AND

SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST V. DRIEHAUS

The Supreme Court has used arguably conflicting tests for when a plaintiff’s allegations about potential future injuries are sufficiently imminent to
constitute an injury for Article III standing.56 In its 2013 decision Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA,57 the Court, in a sharply divided 5-4 decision, with
a majority opinion written by Justice Alito, announced that a plaintiff alleging
it will suffer future injuries from a defendant’s allegedly improper conduct
must show that such injuries are “certainly impending,”58 which is a very
strict standard of proof.59 The decision was arguably vague or ambiguous
about whether the strict, “certainly impending”60 test was limited to cases in
which the government is involved in the use of espionage, as in Clapper, to
protect the nation’s national security or whether that test is more generally
applicable in other factual scenarios.61 Furthermore, the Clapper decision
51 Lamparello, supra note 3, at 120–21.
52 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Lamparello, supra note 3, at 121.
53 See Lamparello, supra note 3, at 121.
54 Id. at 126–28.
55 See infra Conclusion; see also Lamparello, supra note 3, at 120–21, 127–29.
56 See Marty Lederman, Commentary: Susan B. Anthony List, Clapper Footnote 5, and
the State of Article III Standing Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG (June 17, 2014, 4:34 PM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/commentary-susan-b-anthony-list-clapper-footnote-5-andthe-state-of-article-iii-standing-doctrine/ (discussing the conflict on the Court between the
“certainly impending” test for future injuries and the “substantial risk” test); see also Mank,
Two or Three, supra note *, at 222–40.
57 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
58 Id. at 1143.
59 See Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 10–15 (discussing Clapper); Mank, Two or
Three, supra note *, at 222–40 (same); Lederman, supra note 56 (same).
60 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1143.
61 As previously stated:
The Clapper decision sent mixed signals about whether its approach to standing was generally applicable to all cases or whether it was more limited to stand-
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arguably involved separation of powers and political-question-doctrine issues
not present in data breach cases involving private parties.62 However, in a
footnote, the Clapper majority opinion acknowledged in response to Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion that the Court had sometimes used a less strict
“substantial risk” test.63 Since the Clapper decision, some lower courts have
applied or discussed using the alternative, “substantial risk” standard in
Clapper.64
In 2014, the Court in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus,65 a unanimous
decision written by Justice Thomas, suggested that a plaintiff, in some circumstances, need only establish a substantial risk of future harm to demonstrate Article III standing. An Ohio statute “makes it a crime for any person
to ‘[m]ake a false statement concerning the voting record of a candidate or
public official.’ ”66 During the 2010 election cycle, Susan B. Anthony List
(SBA), a “pro-life advocacy organization,” accused then-Congressman Steve
Driehaus, who was running for re-election to Congress, of supporting a
healthcare bill that purportedly provided taxpayer-funded abortion procedures.67 In response, Congressman Driehaus filed a complaint with the Ohio
Elections Commission alleging that SBA’s claims violated the false-statement
statute.68 In October 2010, responding to his complaint, the Commission in
ing in intelligence-gathering and foreign affairs cases. As the majority observed,
“we have often found a lack of standing in cases in which the Judiciary has been
requested to review actions of the political branches in the fields of intelligence
gathering and foreign affairs.” The Court then cited three prior decisions that
had denied standing to plaintiffs in cases involving intelligence or military affairs.
The question that the Clapper Court never fully answered is whether its narrow
interpretations of both the “certainly impending” injury requirement and the
“fairly traceable” causation requirement are only applicable to intelligence and
foreign affairs cases or more broadly applicable to standing questions in a wide
variety of contexts. The text of the majority opinion suggests that the “certainly
impending” test is broadly applicable, but footnote 5 raises serious questions
about the test.
Mank, Two or Three, supra note *, at 225–26 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Clapper, 133 S.
Ct. at 1147).
62 See Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146; Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 64–65.
63 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5.
64 See, e.g., Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2013) (discussing and
applying the “substantial risk” test from Clapper as a means for pre-enforcement review of
possible criminal charges), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1936 (2014) (mem.); Organic Seed Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co., 718 F.3d 1350, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (concluding
the plaintiff met the “substantial risk” test in Clapper), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 901 (2014)
(mem.); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. FDA, 710 F.3d 71, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2013) (distinguishing
Clapper on the grounds that health risks from the chemical triclosan were not “highly speculative”); Mank, Two or Three, supra note *, at 264–74 (discussing cases).
65 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014).
66 Id. at 2338–39 (alteration in original) (discussing and quoting the Ohio false statement statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21(B)(9) (West 2016), and related statutes).
67 Id. at 2339 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 525 Fed. App’x 415, 416 (6th Cir. 2013)).
68 Id.
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a preliminary decision “voted 2 to 1 to find probable cause that a violation
had been committed” by SBA.69 SBA then unsuccessfully sought injunctive
relief from a federal district court and then the Sixth Circuit to block the
Commission from holding a final hearing on the merits of the case.70 SBA
and Driehaus agreed to postpone the hearing until after the November 2010
election.71 After he lost the congressional election, Driehaus moved to withdraw the complaint and the Commission granted the motion with SBA’s
consent.72
SBA then filed suit in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of the statute on First Amendment grounds, alleging that the statute
chilled and burdened its right to comment on election candidates and that it
planned to make similar comments in future elections.73 The district court
dismissed SBA’s suit and a similar suit by another organization as non-justiciable, concluding that neither suit presented a sufficiently concrete injury for
purposes of standing or ripeness.74 The Sixth Circuit affirmed on ripeness
grounds.75 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding
that SBA had Article III standing to sue.76
In Susan B. Anthony, the Court treated both tests in Clapper as valid, stating: “An allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is
‘certainly impending,’ or there is a ‘“substantial risk” that the harm will
occur.’ ”77 The Susan B. Anthony decision appeared to rely on the substantial
risk test in concluding that “the threat of future enforcement of the false
statement statute [was] substantial.”78 The Susan B. Anthony decision cited
69 Id.
70 Id. at 2339–40.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 2340.
73 Id. The district court consolidated SBA’s suit with a separate suit brought by petitioner Coalition Opposed to Additional Spending and Taxes, an advocacy organization
that also alleged that the same Ohio false statement provisions are unconstitutional both
facially and as applied. Id.
74 Id. (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 525 Fed. App’x 415, 420–22 (6th Cir.
2013), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014)).
75 Id. at 2340–41 (discussing Susan B. Anthony, 525 Fed. App’x at 420–22).
76 Id. at 2338, 2341, 2343–47.
77 Id. at 2341 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 n.5.
(2013)); see also MadStad Eng’g, Inc. v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 756 F.3d 1366,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“This sentence [from Susan B. Anthony] seems to support MadStad’s
argument that there is a separate ‘substantial risk’ test that survived Clapper and that the
district court should have considered. We need not decide whether these are alternative
tests for standing applicable to all factual circumstances, however.”); Chevron Corp. v.
Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 554 n.1257 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Clapper acknowledged that
the ‘substantial risk’ and ‘clearly impending’ standards may be coextensive and, even if
they are not, did not abandon the former.” (citing Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1130 n.5)).
78 Susan B. Anthony, 134 S. Ct. at 2345; see also Lederman, supra note 56 (“Susan B.
Anthony does appear to indicate that it is footnote 5 of Clapper—rather than the broader
statements in that case about the need for plaintiffs to demonstrate ‘certainly impending’
harm—that will generally govern Article III standing doctrine going forward.”).
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Clapper as providing mild indirect support, indicating that readers should
compare the case for its conclusion that the Ohio Election Commission’s
prior enforcement against the organization implied a substantial risk of
future enforcement.79
The Court held that SBA met the Article III injury requirement because
the organization faced a “credible” threat of enforcement by the Commission
in future elections.80 The Court concluded it was likely that SBA would
accuse candidates in future elections of supporting “taxpayer-funded abortion” and that the Commission would conclude that such statements violated
Ohio’s broad false-statement law.81 The Court concluded that the risk of
future enforcement against SBA was substantial because of past enforcement
actions against SBA, the fact that a majority of the Commission had already
found “probable cause” that SBA had violated the statute,82 because “any person” may file a complaint,83 because the Commission hears “about 20 to 80
false-statement complaints per year,”84 and because the burden of facing a
hearing may chill free speech even if there is no conviction.85 Furthermore,
the Court held that “burdensome Commission proceedings here are backed
by the additional threat of criminal prosecution. We conclude that the combination of those two threats suffices to create an Article III injury under the
circumstances of this case.”86 While data breach cases involve significantly
different facts and policy considerations than the threat of prosecution in
Susan B. Anthony, the willingness of the Court in that case to apply a more
79

As the Court noted:
We have observed that past enforcement against the same conduct is good evidence that the threat of enforcement is not “chimerical.” [In Clapper,] plaintiffs’
theory of standing was “substantially undermine[d]” by their “fail[ure] to offer
any evidence that their communications ha[d] been monitored” under the challenged statute[ ]. Here, the threat is even more substantial given that the Commission panel actually found probable cause to believe that SBA’s speech violated
the false statement statute.
Susan B. Anthony, 134 S. Ct. at 2345 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted) (first quoting Steffel v. Thompson,
415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974); and then quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1148).
80 Id. at 2343–46.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 2345.
83 Id. (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.153(A) (West 2016)).
84 Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 46, Susan B. Anthony, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (No. 13193)).
85 Id. at 234–46.
86 Id. at 2346 (citing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 302
n.1 (1979)). Subsequently, on remand, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio held that Ohio’s political false-statements laws violated the First Amendment’s protections for political speech. Susan B. Anthony List v. Ohio Election Comm’n, 45 F. Supp.
3d 765, 770 (S.D. Ohio 2014); see also Rick Hasen, Breaking: Federal Court Strikes Down Ohio
False Campaign Speech Statute: Analysis, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Sept. 11, 2014, 2:09 PM), http:/
/electionlawblog.org/?p=65323 (analyzing the district court decision holding that Ohio’s
political false-statement laws violate the First Amendment).
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lenient standing standard for future injuries than Clapper’s “certainly
impending” test provides at least some argument for a more lenient standard
in data breach cases where there is an increased potential for future identity
theft because of the breach but no actual harm at the time a suit is filed.87
III.

IDENTITY THEFT
A.

1.

AND

CREDIT FRAUD CASES BEFORE

AND

AFTER CLAPPER

Cases Allowing Standing Before Clapper

The Seventh Circuit in Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp

In 2007, in Pisciotta v. Old National Bancorp,88 the Seventh Circuit in a
data breach case involving a defendant bank held that the plaintiffs’ allegations of a threat of future harm from the breach were sufficient to confer
Article III standing.89 However, the Seventh Circuit also held that the plaintiffs’ breach of contract and negligence actions, seeking recovery of the costs
of credit monitoring services pursuant to Indiana law, must fail in the
absence of present, actual damages.90 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Pisciotta demonstrates that there is no guarantee in data breach cases that a plaintiff will win on the merits even if successful on the preliminary jurisdictional
issue of Article III standing.91
The Pisciotta decision’s discussion of standing was brief. The Seventh
Circuit acknowledged, and cited in a footnote, four federal district court
decisions from different jurisdictions, including two unpublished decisions,
that had in 2006 or in 2007 denied Article III standing in data breach cases
on the grounds that a mere breach of a computer system without actual harm
was an insufficient injury for Article III standing.92 The Seventh Circuit disagreed with those decisions, stating: “As many of our sister circuits have
noted, the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future
harm or by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of
future harm that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant’s actions.”93 In footnote three, the Pisciotta decision cited decisions
from the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits that recognized standing
for possible future injuries from exposure to toxic substances or defective
medical implements.94 In footnote four, the Pisciotta decision cited three
prior Seventh Circuit decisions that held that a future risk of harm is sufficient to establish a cognizable injury for standing purposes as long as the
probability of injury is more than hypothetical.95 Based on the cases it cited
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

See infra Section III.D, Conclusion.
499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 634; see also Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 17, 21–22 (discussing Pisciotta).
Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 634–40.
See id.
Id. at 634 & n.2.
Id. at 634.
Id. at 634 n.3.
Id. at 634 n.4.
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in footnotes three and four, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Pisciotta implied
that plaintiffs in data breach cases could establish standing if there was at
least a small probability that the breach could cause future injury.96 After the
Clapper decision, district courts in the Seventh Circuit have disagreed
whether Pisciotta’s liberal approach to standing in data breach cases is still
valid;97 the Seventh Circuit, in its Remijas decision, recognized standing in a
data breach case, but did not directly address whether the Pisciotta decision is
still good law.98
2.

The Sixth Circuit in Beaudry v. Telecheck Services, Inc.

In 2009, in Beaudry v. Telecheck Services, Inc.,99 the Sixth Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Jeffrey Sutton, held that a plaintiff had standing to bring a
claim against defendants, which provided check verification services for willful violations of the FCRA,100 even though she could not prove she had suffered any consequential damages, because the statute establishes statutory
damages for willful violations.101 The plaintiff in her complaint alleged that
the defendants willfully violated her rights under the FCRA because they
failed to address a change in the numbering system used by the Tennessee
state driver’s license system, and, as a result, erroneously reported the plaintiff as a first-time check-writer when businesses used the defendants’ check
verification services to determine the worthiness of the plaintiff’s checks.102
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case on the
grounds that the plaintiff had not proven an injury, but the Sixth Circuit
reversed the dismissal of the case on the grounds that the alleged willful violation of her statutory rights pursuant to the FCRA was an injury sufficient to
96 See id. at 634 nn. 3–4.
97 Compare Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc., No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 3511500, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. July 14, 2014) (“I respectfully disagree with my colleagues that Clapper should be read to
overrule Pisciotta’s holding that an elevated risk of identity theft is a cognizable injury-infact.”), with Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 878–79 (N.D. Ill.
2014) (“Clapper seems rather plainly to reject the premise, implicit in Pisciotta . . . that any
marginal increase in risk is sufficient to confer standing. . . . It is difficult . . . to reconcile . . . the Court’s emphatic reiteration of the ‘certainly impending’ standard, with the
Seventh Circuit’s seeming view in Pisciotta that any risk of future harm suffices to confer
standing. . . . To the extent that Pisciotta stands for the proposition that a risk of future
harm does not have to be ‘imminent,’ ‘certainly impending,’ or pose greater than an
objectively reasonable likelihood of injury (the standard Clapper expressly rejected as inadequate), this Court cannot square it with Clapper.” (footnote omitted)). See generally Jacobus
& Watson, supra note 6, at 31–32, 53–55, 57–58, 60–61, 64, 66 (discussing the split in lower
court decisions as to whether Pisciotta remains good law after the Clapper decision).
98 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692–97 (7th Cir. 2015); see also
infra subsection III.D.3.
99 579 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2009).
100 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), 1681n(a) (2012).
101 Beaudry, 579 F.3d at 703, 705–08.
102 Id. at 703–05. She also tried to file the suit as a class action for other Tennessean
consumers. Id.
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establish standing and to defeat the defendants’ motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).103
Because the plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated her personal
statutory rights, Judge Sutton concluded that she had met Article III’s injury
requirement for standing because Congress has considerable discretion in
defining statutory injury as long as a plaintiff alleges an individual rather
than a collective injury, as was recognized by the Supreme Court’s Havens
Realty Corp. v. Coleman decision.104 As will be discussed in Section III.D, some
subsequent decisions have also relied on the statutory standing principles in
the Court’s Havens Realty Corp. decision to justify a statutory standing injury
despite the absence of actual damages as an exception to the “certainly
impending” standard in Clapper.105 The Beaudry decision is most useful as a
precedent for plaintiffs alleging willful violations by a defendant of a federal
statutory right, as opposed to those raising state common law claims.
3.

The Ninth Circuit in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.

In 2010, in Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.,106 the Ninth Circuit held that the
plaintiffs’ allegation that the theft of a laptop from their employer subjected
them to increased risk of future identity theft was sufficient to establish
injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III standing.107 In 2008, someone stole a
laptop from Starbucks Corporation (Starbucks).108 The laptop contained
the unencrypted names, addresses, and social security numbers of approximately 97,000 Starbucks employees.109 Starbucks sent a letter to each of its
affected employees alerting them to the potential danger of identity theft
and offering to pay for one year of credit monitoring.110
Several current and former Starbucks employees whose personal information was stored on the stolen laptop sued Starbucks, alleging that it acted
negligently and breached an implied contract under state law in failing to
protect their personal data.111 The district court concluded that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries met Article III standing requirements, but on the merits
granted Starbucks’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs
failed to allege a cognizable injury under state law.112 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed both the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs met
103 Id. at 703–08.
104 Id. at 707–09 (citing Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982)).
105 See infra Section III.D.
106 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
107 Id. at 1140–43; see also Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 22–23 (discussing
Krottner).
108 Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1140.
109 Id. at 1140.
110 Id. at 1140–41.
111 Id.
112 Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL307.txt

2017]

unknown

Seq: 17

21-MAR-17

data breaches, identity theft, and standing

12:30

1339

Article III standing requirements and its dismissal of the suit on the
merits.113
Because the defendant did not dispute standing causation or redressability, the Ninth Circuit focused on whether the plaintiffs had alleged a
sufficient injury for Article III standing.114 Initially, the court determined
that plaintiff Lalli’s allegation that he “has generalized anxiety and stress” as a
result of the laptop theft constituted the only present injury asserted by any
of the plaintiffs, and that all the other allegations addressed potential future
injuries from identity theft.115 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Lalli’s allegations of present emotional distress were sufficient for standing because the
Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Doe v. Chao116 had suggested that allegations of similar emotional distress were sufficient for Article III standing, but
were insufficient to win damages under the Federal Privacy Act.117
Next, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the plaintiffs’ allegations of
increased risk of future identity theft were sufficient to establish injury for
Article III standing.118 The court observed that several environmental cases
or cases seeking medical monitoring expenses after plaintiffs were exposed to
toxic substances had recognized standing for potential future injuries.119
The Seventh Circuit in Pisciotta relied on these environmental and medical
monitoring cases to allow standing for plaintiffs alleging that they are at an
increased risk of future identity theft as a result of a data breach of a defendant’s computers.120 On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit in Lambert v. Hartman121 recognized standing where a plaintiff suffered actual financial loss
and the thief acknowledged obtaining the plaintiff’s personal data from a
government website, but had, according to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation
of the case, “noted, without analysis, that the risk of future identity theft was
somewhat ‘hypothetical’ and ‘conjectural.’ ”122 The Ninth Circuit in Krottner
disagreed with the Lambert decision’s view that the risk of future identity theft
was “somewhat ‘hypothetical’ and ‘conjectural,’ ” and instead agreed with the
approach in the Pisciotta decision that the plaintiffs “have alleged a credible
threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data.”123 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
held that the plaintiffs’ allegations of potential future harm from identity
theft as a result of the data breach were sufficient injury for Article III stand113 Id. at 1140–43.
114 Id. at 1141–43.
115 Id. at 1142.
116 540 U.S. 614 (2004).
117 Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142 (citing Chao, 540 U.S. at 617–18, 624–25).
118 Id. at 1142–43.
119 Id. at 1142.
120 Id. at 1142–43.
121 517 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2008).
122 Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lambert, 517
F.3d at 437).
123 Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL307.txt

1340

unknown

Seq: 18

notre dame law review

21-MAR-17

12:30

[vol. 92:3

ing.124 As will be discussed in Section III.D, courts in the Ninth Circuit have
continued to apply the liberal approach to standing in data breach cases
employed in Krottner even after the Clapper decision.125 However, lower
courts in other circuits have questioned the continuing validity of Krottner in
light of the Clapper decision.126
B.

Cases Denying Standing Before Clapper

Before the Clapper decision, the most important case to deny standing in
a data breach case was the Third Circuit’s 2011 decision in Reilly v. Ceridian.127 In Reilly, two law firm employees brought a putative class action
against a payroll processing firm, the defendant Ceridian Corporation, after
a hacker breached Ceridian’s computer system and gained access to the personal and financial data of 27,000 employees at 1900 companies, including
the plaintiffs’ information.128 It is unknown whether the hacker used any of
the data.129 Ceridian sent letters to the potential identity theft victims
informing them of the breach, and offered to provide the potentially affected
individuals with one year of free credit monitoring and identity theft
protection.130
The plaintiffs filed suit, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
situated, alleging various claims, including negligence and breach of contract, related to an increased risk of identity theft and incurred costs to monitor credit activity, as well as a claim for emotional distress.131 The district
court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing and also for failure
to state a claim on the merits because they failed to adequately allege the
damage, injury, and ascertainable loss elements of their claims.132 On
appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court on the
sole ground that the plaintiffs’ “allegations of hypothetical, future injury do
not establish standing under Article III.”133
The Third Circuit quoted the Supreme Court’s 1990 decision in Whitmore v. Arkansas for the principle that allegations of future injury are sufficient for the injury-in-fact requirement of Article III standing only if those
threatened injuries are “certainly impending” and imminent, so as to avoid
124 Id.
125 See, e.g., In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1212–14 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (arguing the Krottner decision is consistent with the Clapper decision); see also Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 26, 58, 64 (discussing Ninth Circuit cases following the
Krottner decision); infra Section III.D.
126 See Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 55–56 (discussing lower court decisions
outside the Ninth Circuit cases questioning the Krottner decision); infra Section III.C.
127 664 F.3d 38 (3rd Cir. 2011); see also Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 23–24 (discussing Reilly).
128 Reilly, 664 F.3d at 40.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 41.
133 Id. at 41–46.
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suits based on speculative or hypothetical harms.134 The subsequent Clapper
decision also relied on Whitmore in making the “certainly impending” standard the key to whether a future injury is sufficient for Article III standing,135
but in a footnote the Clapper majority opinion acknowledged that the Court
had sometimes used a less stringent “substantial risk” standard,136 and Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion demonstrated that the Court in several cases had
used a less stringent standard.137 Thus, the Third Circuit’s reliance on the
“certainly impending” standard was a possible reading of the Supreme
Court’s precedent on when allegations of future injury are sufficient for Article III standing, but the Court’s standing doctrine regarding that question is
far more complicated than that standard.138
In Reilly, the Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations
regarding potential future identity theft were mere “speculation.”139 The
court stated, “Unless and until these conjectures [of the hacker using the
plaintiffs’ personal information to their detriment by making unauthorized
transactions in their names] come true, Appellants have not suffered any
injury; there has been no misuse of the information, and thus, no harm.”140
The Reilly decision emphasized that the plaintiffs’ “alleged increased risk of
future injury is even more attenuated, because it is dependent on entirely
speculative, future actions of an unknown third-party.”141
The Third Circuit distinguished the situations in both the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Pisciotta and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Krottner as
involving significantly greater risk of future harm than the facts in the Reilly
case.142 The Third Circuit stated:
[I]n Pisciotta and Krottner, the threatened harms were significantly more
“imminent” and “certainly impending” than the alleged harm here. In Pisciotta, there was evidence that “the [hacker’s] intrusion was sophisticated,
intentional and malicious.” In Krottner, someone attempted to open a bank
account with a plaintiff’s information following the physical theft of the
laptop. Here, there is no evidence that the intrusion was intentional or malicious. Appellants have alleged no misuse, and therefore, no injury. Indeed,
no identifiable taking occurred; all that is known is that a firewall was pene134 Id. at 42 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
135 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143, 1147–48 (2013) (quoting Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 157–60).
136 Id. at 1150 n.5; see also Mank, Two or Three, supra note *, at 221, 230–31, 236–37
(discussing the “substantial risk” test in footnote 5 of Clapper).
137 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1160–65 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Mank, Two or Three,
supra note *, at 236–39 (discussing Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Clapper).
138 See also Mank, Two or Three, supra note *, at 221, 230–31, 236–39, 269, 275 (discussing the Supreme Court’s use of standards other than Clapper’s “certainly impending” test
in deciding when allegations of future injury are sufficient for Article III standing).
139 Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42–43.
140 Id. at 42.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 43–44; see also Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 23–24 (discussing how Reilly
distinguished the Pisciotta and Krottner decisions).
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trated. Appellants’ string of hypothetical injuries do not meet the requirement of an “actual or imminent” injury.143

Additionally, the Third Circuit criticized both the Pisciotta and the
Krottner decisions for failing to apply the correct constitutional standing test
requiring an “imminent” and “certainly impending” risk of future injury.144
The Reilly decision stated:
Neither Pisciotta nor Krottner, moreover, discussed the constitutional
standing requirements and how they apply to generalized data theft situations. Indeed, the Pisciotta court did not mention—let alone discuss—the
requirement that a threatened injury must be “imminent” and “certainly
impending” to confer standing. Instead of making a determination as to
whether the alleged injury was “certainly impending,” both courts simply
analogized data-security-breach situations to defective-medical-device, toxicsubstance-exposure, or environmental-injury cases.145

The Third Circuit argued that the defective-medical-device, toxic-substance-exposure, or environmental-injury cases relied on by both the Pisciotta
and Krottner decisions were not good analogies to mere data breaches
because the former cases involved actual or quantifiable risks of serious
harms to the human health or the environment that often cannot be adequately compensated through monetary damages because human health or
environmental habitat, once damaged, may never be perfectly restored.146
By contrast, the plaintiffs in Reilly merely speculated that a hacker might
cause unquantifiable future financial losses.147 Anticipating the approach in
the subsequent Clapper decision, the Third Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs’ expenditures on preventative measures such as credit monitoring could
not be used to establish standing when the plaintiffs could not prove that
they would suffer future injuries as a result of the actions of the defendants;148 similarly, the Clapper decision held that the plaintiffs’ expenditure of
travel monies to avoid electronic surveillance by the government could not
establish standing injury when the plaintiffs could not prove the government
was actually spying on them but merely speculated that spying might
occur.149 Accordingly, the Reilly decision held that the plaintiffs failed to
prove standing injury and dismissed their case.150 The Third Circuit’s
approach to standing, requiring an “imminent” and “certainly impending”
risk of future injury, was far narrower than either the Pisciotta or Krottner
143 Reilly, 664 F.3d at 44 (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted) (quoting Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007)).
144 Id. at 44–46.
145 Id. at 44 (citations omitted).
146 Id. at 44–46; see also Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 23–24 (discussing how Reilly
questioned the standing analysis in the Pisciotta and Krottner decisions).
147 Reilly, 664 F.3d at 45.
148 Id. at 46.
149 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150–53 (2013); see also Mank, Two or
Three, supra note *, at 231–32.
150 Reilly, 664 F.3d at 46.
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decisions, but the Reilly decision left open the possibility that some instances
of data breach involving evidence of intentional or malicious intrusion could
meet the Article III standing test.151
C.
1.

Cases Denying Standing After Clapper

The Southern District of Ohio in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Co.

Some lower court decisions have interpreted the Clapper decision’s “certainly impending” standard to bar data breach suits where there is no proof
of actual injury from the breach and there is only an increased risk of future
injury.152 In Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,153 consumers
brought related putative class actions in the federal district court for the
Southern District of Ohio against defendant insurer Nationwide Mutual
Insurance Company, alleging violations of the FCRA, negligence, invasion of
privacy, and bailment, stemming from a third party hacker’s theft of the
plaintiffs’ personally identifiable information (PII) from the insurer’s computer network.154 The defendant had sent a letter to the plaintiffs alerting
them to the data breach and offering them one year of free credit monitoring and identity theft protection.155 Additionally, the defendant suggested
that the plaintiffs place a security freeze on their credit reports at their own
expense.156 Neither of the two named plaintiffs alleged that his personal
information was misused or that his identity was stolen as a result of the data
breach.157
Judge Michael H. Watson’s opinion emphasized the Clapper decision’s
“certainly impending” standard in concluding that the plaintiffs’ allegations
that they were at an increased risk of future identity theft was insufficient to
establish a standing injury because Clapper had rejected “similar” allegations
by the plaintiffs in that case (that they were at an increased risk of future
government surveillance because of the types of clients that they represented) as insufficient to demonstrate standing injury.158 The Galaria district
court stated:
151 Id. at 42–46.
152 See generally Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 50–61 (arguing that many, but not
all, lower court decisions applying Clapper’s “certainly impending” test in data breach cases
have required more evidence of imminent harm from the breach than many pre-Clapper
decisions).
153 998 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d, Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016 WL 4728027
(6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016).
154 Id. at 646.
155 Id. at 650.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 651, 654–56 (discussing the Clapper decision’s “certainly impending” standard); see also Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 54–55, 59–60 (observing that the Galaria
decision interpreted Clapper to reject standing based solely upon an increased risk of
future identity theft).
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In this case, an increased risk of identity theft, identity fraud, medical
fraud or phishing is not itself an injury-in-fact because Named Plaintiffs did
not allege—or offer facts to make plausible—an allegation that such harm is
“certainly impending.” Even though Plaintiffs alleged they are 9.5 times
more likely than the general public to become victims of theft or fraud, that
factual allegation sheds no light as to whether theft or fraud meets the “certainly impending” standard. That is, a factual allegation as to how much
more likely they are to become victims than the general public is not the same
as a factual allegation showing how likely they are to become victims.
Other allegations in the Complaint show such harm is not certainly
impending. For example, Named Plaintiffs state that consumers who receive
a data breach notification had a fraud incidence rate of 19% in 2011. An
injury can hardly be said to be “certainly impending” if there is less than a
20% chance of it occurring.159

Judge Watson also concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations of future
injury were speculative because they depended upon the decisions of independent, third-party criminals outside the control of the defendant.160
Additionally, in a footnote, the Galaria district court concluded that a
less-than-twenty-percent chance of identity theft was insufficient to meet the
Supreme Court’s alternative “substantial risk” standing test acknowledged by
the Clapper decision.161 Nor could the Galaria plaintiffs’ alleged expenditures to avoid future identity theft establish standing injury: the Clapper decision rejected its plaintiffs’ argument that their expenditures to avoid
government surveillance could establish standing because “respondents cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on
their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.”162
Finally, Judge Watson acknowledged decisions such as Pisciotta or Krottner,
which found standing in data breach cases where there was only an increased
risk of future injury, but he concluded that they were no longer good law in
light of the subsequent Clapper decision’s “certainly impending” standard.163
Accordingly, because the plaintiffs’ complaint did not sufficiently allege that
their risk of future identity theft was “certainly impending,” the Galaria district court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish an Article III standing
injury for their common law claims.164
159 Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 654 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
160 Id. at 655. But see In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1216
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (criticizing Galaria’s reasoning that it was uncertain whether third-party
hackers would steal information from plaintiffs because “after all, why would hackers target
and steal personal customer data if not to misuse it?”).
161 Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 654 n.8.
162 Id. at 657 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l
USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143, 1151 (rejecting respondents’ alternative argument that they
were suffering “present injury because the risk of . . . surveillance already has forced them to
take costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their international
communications”)).
163 Id. at 656.
164 Id. at 658.
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The Galaria plaintiffs also argued that they had statutory standing for
their FCRA claims.165 The FCRA’s sections 1681n(a) and 1681o establish
“causes of action for, respectively, the willful and negligent failure ‘to comply
with any requirement imposed under this subchapter.’ ”166 Judge Watson
concluded that the plaintiffs’ vague allegations that the defendant should
have employed more protective measures to prevent data breaches were
insufficient because their complaint failed to allege a specific duty set forth
in the FCRA that the defendant allegedly violated.167 Thus, he concluded
that the plaintiffs had failed to establish statutory standing for their FCRA
claims.168
In 2016, the Sixth Circuit in a divided decision reversed and remanded
for further proceedings the district court’s decision in Galaria.169 The court
of appeals concluded that the district court had erred in dismissing the FCRA
claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.170 Disagreeing with the district
court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a “substantial
risk” of identity theft because that risk was less than twenty percent,171 the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged a substantial risk of
fraud and identity theft because “their data has already been stolen and is
now in the hands of ill-intentioned criminals.”172 While acknowledging that
it was not certain that criminals would misuse the plaintiffs’ stolen personal
data, the court of appeals determined that the failure of Nationwide to pay
for a “security freeze” that the defendant had recommended to the plaintiffs
established that the plaintiffs had suffered a concrete and unmitigated injury
sufficient for Article III standing.173
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that its conclusion was “in line” with the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Remijas and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Kottner,
although inconsistent with the Third Circuit’s Reilly decision.174 However,
the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that victims of a data breach suffer a substantial
injury from the breach alone without any actual misuse of the data is arguably broader than the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Remijas where 9200 customers had already suffered actual fraudulent uses of their credit cards or
bank accounts.175 The Sixth Circuit in Galaria tried to align itself with the
Remijas decision by quoting language from the Seventh Circuit’s decision
that hackers presumably steal private information for the purpose of eventu165 Id. at 652.
166 Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(a), 1681o (2012)).
167 Id. at 653.
168 Id.
169 Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016 WL 4728027, at *1, *6
(6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2016).
170 Id.
171 Galaria, 998 F. Supp. 2d at 654 n.8.
172 Galaria, 2016 WL 4728027, at *3.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 4.
175 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 690, 692-93 (7th Cir. 2015).
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ally committing fraud.176 The Seventh Circuit in Remijas used the actual misuse of 9200 customers’ data to establish that there was indeed a substantial
risk of intentional hacking and fraud, but did not squarely address whether a
data breach alone is sufficient for Article III standing.177
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Alice M. Batchelder “disagree[d] with
the majority’s conclusion that the complaints have adequately pled a causal
connection between Nationwide’s alleged inaction and the plaintiffs’ alleged
injury.”178 She reasoned that it was unnecessary for her to address the split
in the circuits regarding whether an increased risk of identity theft is an Article III injury because she concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish
the second prong of Article III standing, whether there was a causal connection between the defendants’ actions and the plaintiffs’ injuries.179 Judge
Batchelder argued that the plaintiffs could not simply allege that Nationwide’s lax security measures allowed the hackers to access the plaintiffs’ private data, but must specifically explain what measures Nationwide could have
used to prevent the breach and whether the defendant failed to use such
preventative measures.180 She disagreed with the reasoning of Remijas and
other decisions holding defendants liable for data breaches because they
“completely ignore[d] the independent third party criminal action breaking
the chain of causation.”181 Her focus on the issue of standing causation
rather than on whether there was a sufficient injury for Article III standing is
quite different from the overwhelming majority of cases discussed in this
Article.182
Because defendants are in a better position to know whether they could
have prevented a data breach than plaintiffs, it is unfair to adopt Judge
Batchelder’s approach of placing the burden on the plaintiffs to explain what
measures the defendant should have used to prevent the breach, in order to
establish standing causation. In Remijas, the Seventh Circuit appropriately
reasoned that a plaintiff may establish standing causation by providing plausible evidence that a defendant’s actions harmed the plaintiff and that a defendant may, at trial, show that other data breaches actually caused the harm to
the plaintiff.183 Furthermore, courts might allow defendants to make an
affirmative defense on the merits: that they used all reasonable measures to
prevent the data breach.

176 Galaria, 2016 WL 4728027, at *4.
177 See Remijas, 794 F.3d at 692-96; subsection III.D.3.
178 Galaria, 2016 WL 4728027, at *6 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
179 Id.
180 Id. at *7–8.
181 Id. at *8.
182 Compare id. at *6–8, with Part III (discussing several cases focusing on the issue of
whether a data breach poses a sufficient Article III standing injury).
183 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696.
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The Decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
Regarding In re: Science Applications International Corp. Backup Tape
Data Theft Litigation

Agreeing with the Galaria decision, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia concluded in its case In re: Science Applications International
Corp. Backup Tape Data Theft Litigation (SAIC)184 that the risk of identity theft
alone is insufficient to establish an injury in fact sufficient for Article III
standing in light of the Clapper decision’s “certainly impending” standard or
even its alternative “substantial risk” test.185 In SAIC, a thief broke into a car
and stole several data tapes.186 The tapes belonged to an employee of Science Applications International Corporation, an information-technology
company that handles data for the federal government.187 The tapes contained personal information and medical records concerning 4.7 million
members of the U.S. military and their families who were enrolled in TRICARE healthcare.188
SAIC mailed letters to the service members affected by the data
breach.189 SAIC offered all affected members one year of free credit monitoring and identity theft protection.190 Additionally, SAIC, in its letter,
argued that the risk that any “information could be obtained from these
tapes is low since accessing, viewing and using the data requires specific hardware and software.”191
The plaintiffs filed several lawsuits in various courts around the country
alleging injury from an increased likelihood of identity theft from the data
breach and from an invasion of their privacy, among other claims.192 Eight
of those suits were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia as a multidistrict litigation.193 Judge James E. Boasberg concluded
that two of the plaintiffs had made “plausible” assertions that their data was
accessed or abused, and could move forward with their claims; however, he
observed that these two plaintiffs would have to prove that the alleged abuse
occurred as a result of the theft of the SAIC tapes and that there was a significant possibility that the court might ultimately decide on the merits that the
alleged abuse was the result of unrelated data breaches or identity theft.194
184 45 F. Supp. 3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014).
185 Id. at 24–28; see also Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 55–56, 59–60 (observing that
the SAIC decision interpreted Clapper to reject standing based solely upon an increased
risk of future identity theft).
186 SAIC, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 19.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 20.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 19.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 19, 33–34.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-3\NDL307.txt

1348

unknown

Seq: 26

notre dame law review

21-MAR-17

12:30

[vol. 92:3

Next, the SAIC decision addressed whether the plaintiffs, who simply
asserted that they were at an increased risk of future identity theft as a result
of the theft of the SAIC tapes, could establish a sufficient injury for Article III
standing. Agreeing with the Galaria decision and similar district court decisions from around the nation, Judge Boasberg concluded that the plaintiffs’
assertion that they were at a nineteen-percent risk of future identity theft was
insufficient to meet the Clapper decision’s “certainly impending” standard or
even its alternative “substantial risk” test.195 Furthermore, the SAIC decision
agreed with the Galaria decision that decisions prior to the Clapper decision
that had found standing based on a mere increased risk of identity theft
stemming from a data breach were no longer viable.196 Accordingly, Judge
Boasberg held that those plaintiffs who simply asserted that they were at an
increased risk of future identity theft as a result of the theft of the SAIC tapes
could not establish a sufficient injury for Article III standing.197
D.
1.

Cases Allowing Standing After Clapper

The Southern District of California Decision In re Sony Gaming Networks
& Customer Data Security Breach Litigation

Some lower courts have rejected the argument that the Clapper decision’s “certainly impending” standard effectively bars standing for plaintiffs
who are the victims of a data breach, but who can only allege the possibility
of future harms from potential identity theft.198 The U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of California concluded in In re Sony Gaming Networks &
Customer Data Security Breach Litigation199 that the Clapper decision did not
change the “credible threat” test used by the Ninth Circuit in Krottner in concluding that victims of data breaches have suffered a cognizable injury for
195 Id. at 26–28 (first citing Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646
(S.D. Ohio 2014); then citing Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 1
(D.D.C 2007); then citing Whitaker v. Health Net of Cal., Inc., No. 11-910, 2012 WL
174961 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2012); then citing Hammond v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Corp., No.
08-6060, 2010 WL 2643307 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2010); then citing Allison v. Aetna, Inc., No.
09-2560, 2010 WL 3719243 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2010); then citing Amburgy v. Express Scripts,
Inc., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (E.D. Mo. 2009); then citing Bell v. Acxiom Corp., No. 06-485,
2006 WL 2850042 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 3, 2006); then citing Key v. DSW, Inc., 454 F.Supp.2d 684
(S.D. Ohio 2006); and then citing Giordano v. Wachovia Sec., LLC, No. 06-476, 2006 WL
2177036 (D.N.J. July 31, 2006)).
196 Id. at 28 (“Yet after Clapper, Gap III’s ‘credible threat of harm’ standard [for proving
‘actual injury for standing purposes’] is clearly not supportable.” (quoting Ruiz v. Gap,
Inc., 380 F. App’x 689, 691 (9th Cir. 2010) (Gap III))).
197 Id. (“In sum, increased risk of harm alone does not constitute an injury in fact. Nor
do measures taken to prevent a future, speculative harm.”).
198 See Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 57–58, 59, 61, 66–67 (observing that a minority of lower court decisions interpreting Clapper’s “certainly impending” test in data breach
cases have disagreed that it necessarily forecloses success by plaintiffs).
199 996 F. Supp. 2d 942 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
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Article III standing.200 The plaintiffs, a nationwide putative consumer class,
alleged that three related online gaming companies owned by defendant
Sony failed to provide reasonable network security, including utilizing industry-standard encryption, to safeguard their personal and financial information stored on Sony’s network.201 Third-party hackers accessed Sony’s
network and obtained the personal information of millions of Sony’s customers, including the named plaintiffs.202 Sony announced that it would compensate its users in the United States with free identity theft protection
services and certain free downloads and online services, and would consider
helping customers who had to apply for new credit cards.203
After different plaintiffs filed similar suits against defendant Sony in various district courts around the country, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred certain civil actions from these district courts into one
consolidated action before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of California.204 Judge Anthony J. Battaglia denied Sony’s motion to dismiss
the case for lack of standing, but Sony requested that the district court reconsider its decision in light of the Supreme Court’s recent Clapper decision.205
Upon reconsideration, the district court concluded that the Clapper decision
did not overrule the test used by the Ninth Circuit in Krottner in holding that
victims of data breaches have suffered a cognizable injury for Article III
standing. Judge Battaglia reasoned:
[A]lthough the Supreme Court’s word choice in Clapper differed from the
Ninth Circuit’s word choice in Krottner, stating that the harm must be “certainly impending,” rather than “real and immediate,” the Supreme Court’s
decision in Clapper did not set forth a new Article III framework, nor did the
Supreme Court’s decision overrule previous precedent requiring that the
harm be “real and immediate.”206

The Sony decision relied on several district court decisions in the Ninth
Circuit that had followed Krottner in holding that a plaintiff whose personal
information is wrongfully disclosed by a data breach has an Article III injury
sufficient to sue a defendant who has failed to protect that information from
a hacker or thief.207 Applying a “credible threat” test, Judge Battaglia con200 Id. at 960–62; see also Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 26, 51, 58, 64 (observing
that the district court in In re Sony followed the Ninth Circuit’s Krottner decision and distinguished Clapper as involving a less immediate threat than its facts).
201 In re Sony, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 953.
202 Id. at 955.
203 Id. Sony offered slightly different compensation depending upon with which of its
three subsidiaries users did business. Id.
204 Id. at 956.
205 Id. at 956, 960.
206 Id. at 961.
207 Id. at 962 (first citing In re Facebook Privacy Litig., 791 F. Supp. 2d 705 (N.D. Cal.
2011); then citing Doe 1 v. AOL, LLC, 719 F. Supp. 2d 1102 (N.D. Cal 2010); and then
citing San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 905 F. Supp. 2d
1158 (E.D. Cal. 2012)).
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cluded that the plaintiffs had established an Article III standing injury.208 In
a footnote, the Sony decision declined to follow the Third Circuit’s contrary
approach in Reilly—that data breaches unaccompanied by actual harm do
not constitute a sufficient injury for Article III standing.209
2.

Judge Elaine E. Bucklo’s Decision in Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc.

Contrary to decisions by two other federal district court judges,210 in the
U.S. District Court for Northern Illinois, in Moyer v. Michaels Stores, Inc.,211
Judge Elaine E. Bucklo “respectfully disagree[d] with [her] colleagues that
Clapper should be read to overrule Pisciotta’s holding that an elevated risk of
identity theft is a cognizable injury-in-fact.”212 She cited the Sony and Krottner
decisions in support of her conclusion that an elevated risk of identity theft is
sufficient for Article III standing.213 In Moyer, six plaintiffs sued defendant
Michaels Stores, Inc., an arts and crafts retailer, for failing to secure their
credit and debit card information during in-store transactions.214 The complaint asserted claims for breach of implied contract and violations of state
consumer fraud statutes.215 In a press release, Michaels acknowledged that
there was some evidence that stolen credit card numbers, which had been
obtained through malicious software (“malware”) that had infected its pointof-sales systems, had been used in fraudulent transactions.216 After seeing
some evidence of misuse of credit card information, Michaels offered twelve
months of identity protection, credit monitoring, and fraud assistance services to affected customers at no cost.217 There was evidence that the credit
card of Mary Whalen, a putative class member who sought to join the six
plaintiffs, was used fraudulently, and the district court used her injury as evi208 Id.
209 Id. at 963 n.10.
210 See Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2014)
(“Clapper compels rejection of Strautins’ claim that an increased risk of identity theft is
sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing.” (citations omitted)); In re
Barnes & Noble Pin Pad Litig., No. 12–cv–8617, 2013 WL 4759588, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3,
2013) (Darrah, J.) (citing Clapper in support of the proposition that “[m]erely alleging an
increased risk of identity theft or fraud is insufficient to establish standing”).
211 No. 14 C 561, 2014 WL 3511500 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2014).
212 Id. at *5 (first citing In re Sony Gaming Networks and Customer Data Sec. Breach
Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 961–962 (S.D. Cal 2014); and then citing Krottner v. Starbucks,
628 F.3d 1139, 1142–43 (9th Cir. 2010)); see also Jacobus & Watson, supra note 6, at 57–58
(observing that the Moyer decision concluded that Clapper did not implicitly overrule standing analysis in Pisciotta based upon an increased risk of future identity theft, because other
Supreme Court decisions applied a less strict standing approach than Clapper’s for allegations of future injury).
213 Moyer, 2014 WL 3511500, at *5.
214 Id. at *1.
215 Id.
216 Id. at *1–2.
217 Id. at *2.
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dence that the six plaintiffs were at a heightened risk of an imminent injury
from identity theft.218
Addressing the defendant’s argument that the Clapper decision’s stricter
imminence requirement for plaintiffs seeking to establish standing based on
a future risk of harm effectively abrogated the Seventh Circuit’s decision in
Pisciotta, which had recognized standing in data breach cases based on a
heightened risk of identity theft, Judge Bucklo first interpreted Clapper as
having adopted a strict interpretation of the imminence requirement for
standing in the context of whether a national security statute was unconstitutional, and reasoned that “[t]he extent to which Clapper’s admittedly rigorous
standing analysis should apply in a case that presents neither national security nor constitutional issues is an open question.”219 Second, she observed
that the subsequent Susan B. Anthony220 decision:
catalogues the myriad circumstances in which a risk of future harm—such as
enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional law—has been deemed sufficiently imminent to establish Article III standing. The labels used to
describe the imminence requirement in these cases—i.e., injury risks that
are not “chimerical,” “imaginary,” or “wholly speculative” or, conversely,
ones that are “credible” and “well-founded”—sound less demanding than
Clapper’s rigorous application of the “certainly impending” standard.221

Based on “Susan B. Anthony List and the cases cited therein,” Judge
Bucklo concluded that the plaintiffs had introduced sufficient proof “that
they face a credible, non-speculative risk of future harm. Although Plaintiffs
cannot establish standing based solely on Whalen’s injuries, the fraudulent
charges she incurred within two weeks of shopping at Michaels informs my
analysis of whether the risk of identity theft facing these Plaintiffs is substantial and well-founded.”222 Thus, Judge Bucklo used the harms allegedly suffered by a putative class plaintiff to substantiate an elevated risk of future
injury for the six actual plaintiffs.223
Third, she relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farms,224 which recognized that the use of genetically engineered alfalfa gave rise to a “significant risk of gene flow to non-geneticallyengineered varieties of alfalfa” on nearby organic farms, and which the Clap218 Id. at *2–6. But a district court in the Eastern District of New York dismissed
Whalen’s separate suit because she suffered no actual financial losses from fraudulent use
of her credit card, and held there was no standing injury under Clapper’s “certainly
impending” test. Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 577, 579–83 (E.D.N.Y.
2015).
219 Moyer, 2014 WL 3511500, at *5 (citing Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F.
Supp. 3d 871, 878 n.11 (N.D. Ill. 2014)).
220 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014).
221 Moyer, 2014 WL 3511500, at *5 (citations omitted) (first citing Susan B. Anthony, 134
S. Ct. at 2342–43; and then citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147
(2013)).
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 561 U.S. 139 (2010).
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per decision quoted with approval.225 Applying Monsanto’s significant risk
test to the facts of her case, Judge Bucklo concluded:
If a bee’s anticipated pollination patterns create a sufficiently imminent risk
of injury to alfalfa farmers who fear gene flow from genetically engineered
plants in nearby fields, I fail to see how the transfer of information from a
data hacker to an identity thief (assuming they are not one and the same)
could be deemed an overly attenuated risk of harm.226

Accordingly, Judge Bucklo held that the plaintiffs’ allegations that they
were at an “elevated risk of identity theft stemming from the data breach at
Michaels is sufficiently imminent to give Plaintiffs standing.”227 She
explained her reasoning for finding standing as follows:
This conclusion follows from Pisciotta and is consistent with a host of
Supreme Court decisions finding standing based on an imminent risk of
future injury. Clapper is distinguishable based on its admittedly rigorous
application of the “certainly impending” standard in a case that involved (1)
national security and constitutional issues and (2) no evidence that the relevant risk of harm had ever materialized in similar circumstances.228

3.

The Seventh Circuit Distinguishes Clapper in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus
Group, LLC

During 2015, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit in Remijas v.
Neiman Marcus Group, LLC distinguished the Clapper decision in holding that
plaintiffs whose personal data had been stolen from the defendant retailer
had Article III standing to sue based upon evidence of actual fraudulent
charges against some of the plaintiffs, the reasonable potential for future
fraud against all the plaintiffs, and their expenses for credit monitoring services.229 The Seventh Circuit reversed a district court decision that had concluded that the Clapper decision had “foreclose[d] any use whatsoever of
future injuries to support Article III standing” in identity theft cases and
instead applied a “substantial risk” standard that the Clapper decision had
acknowledged was sometimes applicable.230 The Remijas court distinguished
the Clapper decision on the grounds that the Supreme Court’s decision
involved a mere suspicion that the plaintiff’s communications had been
monitored by the government, but that its case involved a substantial risk of
harm to the plaintiffs because hackers had deliberately stolen sensitive information about the plaintiffs and 9200 customers had already suffered actual
fraudulent uses of their credit cards or bank accounts.231 The Seventh Cir225 Moyer, 2014 WL 3511500, at *6 (quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1153).
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693–96 (7th Cir. 2015); see also
Fram et al., supra note 10 (discussing Remijas).
230 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693; see also Fram et al., supra note 10.
231 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693; see also Biglow, supra note 19, at 955–57, 967–69, 972–73,
975 (explaining that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Remijas found Article III standing
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cuit concluded that the harms were fairly traceable to the defendant’s data
breach despite the possibility that some of the information might have been
stolen from third parties, because standing causation requires only plausible
evidence that a defendant’s actions harmed the plaintiffs, and the defendant
would have an opportunity at trial to demonstrate that other data breaches
actually caused the harm to the plaintiffs.232 Additionally, the court concluded that the harms were redressable by a favorable decision of the court,
even though the defendant had reimbursed the plaintiffs for all of their current direct losses, where the plaintiffs alleged incidental costs from time
spent correcting financial information and periods of interrupted access to
credit cards and bank accounts, where there was “an objectively reasonable
likelihood” of an enhanced risk of future identity theft based upon evidence
that some plaintiffs had already suffered fraudulent activity, and where the
defendant had implicitly acknowledged the risks of future harm by offering
one year of credit monitoring.233 Unlike Judge Bucklo, the Seventh Circuit
did not discuss whether its decision in Pisciotta was still good law, but the
court declined to address the plaintiffs’ suggestion that it apply decisions
“involv[ing] products liability claims against defective or dangerous products” to the data breach field because it found standing based on a substantial risk of harm from the data breach and actual evidence of fraudulent
activity.234
4.

The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Robins v. Spokeo, Inc.

In Robins v. Spokeo, Inc.,235 the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant’s
alleged willful violation of the plaintiff’s consumer rights under the FCRA
was a violation of a statutory right sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact
requirement for Article III standing, even if the consumer failed to allege any
actual damages.236 The Robins decision explicitly agreed with the Sixth Circuit’s Beaudry decision and similar pre-Clapper decisions in the Ninth Circuit.237 While it did not even cite the Clapper decision, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in Robins is significant because it treated the concept of statutory
standing as still valid and cited the Supreme Court’s 1975 decision in Warth
v. Seldin238 for the principle that a statute may create legal rights that effectively establish an actual or threatened injury for Article III standing.239 As
will be discussed below, a majority of a three-judge panel in the Eighth Cirwhere 9200 persons had already been harmed by a data breach and remaining plaintiffs
were therefore at a significantly increased risk of harm); Fram et al., supra note 10.
232 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696.
233 Id. at 693–94, 696–97 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147
(2013)); see also Fram et al., supra note 10.
234 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 695.
235 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014).
236 Id. at 412–14.
237 Id.
238 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).
239 Robins, 742 F.3d at 412.
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cuit subsequently agreed with the Robins decision and relied upon the statutory standing principles in Warth, but a dissenting judge argued that the
statutory standing approach in Warth had been effectively discredited by
Clapper and other Supreme Court opinions requiring stronger evidence of
harm to prove standing injuries.240
Thomas Robins sued the defendant, Spokeo, Inc., for willful violations
of the FCRA related to information about the plaintiff contained on the
defendant’s website.241 Spokeo’s website offers users “information about
other individuals, including contact data, marital status, age, occupation, economic health, and wealth level.”242 “Although he asserted that Spokeo’s website contained false information about” his education and wealth level,
Robins’s allegations of actual harm from that allegedly false information were
“sparse.”243 After initially concluding that Robins had established a sufficient
injury for standing, the district court changed its view in response to
Spokeo’s motion for reconsideration and dismissed his case for lack of Article III standing because “Robins failed to plead an injury in fact and that any
injuries pled were not traceable to Spokeo’s alleged violations.”244
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and
held that Robins had proven a statutory standing injury pursuant to the
FCRA.245 The Robins decision reasoned that the plaintiff did not have to
allege actual harm from the defendant’s action because he alleged that
Spokeo had willfully violated the statute and Congress in the FCRA sought to
punish willful violations of the statute even if they do not cause an actual
injury.246 Acknowledging that Article III of the Constitution limits Congress’s authority to confer statutory standing, the Ninth Circuit relied upon
the reasoning in the Beaudry decision for the principle that statutory standing
is appropriate where the plaintiff asserts that his individual statutory rights
have been violated by a defendant.247 The Robins decision concluded that its
plaintiff met the standing test in Beaudry.248 Applying the two-part test in
Beaudry to Robins’s allegations, the Ninth Circuit reasoned:
First, he alleges that Spokeo violated his statutory rights, not just the statutory rights of other people, so he is “among the injured.” Second, the interests protected by the statutory rights at issue are sufficiently concrete and
particularized that Congress can elevate them. . . . Robins’s personal interests in the handling of his credit information are individualized rather than
collective.249
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249

See infra subsection III.D.5.
Robins, 742 F.3d at 410–11.
Id. at 410.
Id.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 412–14.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 413.
Id.
Id.
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While standing also requires a plaintiff to prove causation and redressability in addition to an injury in fact, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that causation and redressability can usually be inferred once a plaintiff proves an
injury in violation of a statutory right.250 The Robins decision explained:
When the injury in fact is the violation of a statutory right that we inferred
from the existence of a private cause of action, causation and redressability
will usually be satisfied. First, there is little doubt that a defendant’s alleged
violation of a statutory provision “caused” the violation of a right created by
that provision. Second, statutes like the FCRA frequently provide for monetary damages, which redress the violation of statutory rights.251

Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Robins had satisfied all three
parts of the Article III standing test.252
In 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.253 The issue in the case was whether Congress may confer Article III
standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore
could not otherwise invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing
a private right of action based on a bare violation of a federal statute.254 The
Seventh Circuit in Remijas argued that the allegations of identity theft in its
case “go far beyond the complaint about a website’s publication of inaccurate
information, in violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, that is before the
Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins”;255 thus, the Seventh Circuit
appeared to be saying that its decision should stand even if the Supreme
Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, a 6-2 decision authored by Justice Alito, holding that a
plaintiff alleging a statutory injury in violation of a federal statute must allege
not only an individualized injury, but also a concrete injury to satisfy the U.S.
Constitution’s Article III standing requirement for an injury in fact.256 The
Court remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit because the court of
appeals found only that Robins had an individualized injury and failed to
address whether he had a concrete injury.257 In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg, who was joined by Justice Sotomayor, maintained that Robins’s
particularized allegations that petitioner Spokeo, Inc., had misreported information about his employment and financial status met the concrete injury
requirement because his complaint alleged that the misinformation on the
250 Id. at 414.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015).
254 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/spokeo-inc-v-robins/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) (providing the history of the case before the Supreme Court).
255 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2015).
256 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545, 1548, 1550 (2016).
257 Id. at 1550.
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Spokeo site harmed his employment prospects, and, accordingly, his allegations were sufficient for standing.258
The majority opinion did not define what constitutes a concrete injury
other than to exclude clearly harmless errors such as an “incorrect zip
code.”259 The Court did state that a plaintiff enforcing a statutory right
“need not allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.”260 The Court’s rejection of an additional harm standard likely means
that any plaintiff seeking information pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)261 may have standing based solely upon his statutory right to
information without alleging that he will suffer additional harms if he does
not obtain that information.262
The Spokeo decision did not clarify the split in the lower courts about
how much financial harm a plaintiff must allege to have standing in data
breach or identity theft cases.263 Citing its Clapper decision, the Court in
Spokeo acknowledged that the “risk of real harm” can satisfy the concreteness
requirement, and, as an example, observed that tort victims may recover
“even if their harms may be difficult to prove or measure.”264 The Supreme
Court’s reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s Spokeo decision might lead that Circuit
to reassess whether a data breach that merely results in an increased risk of
identity theft is a sufficiently concrete injury for Article III standing, but the
Supreme Court’s definition of concrete injury in its Spokeo decision is sufficiently broad that the Ninth Circuit does not need to change its approach in
data breach cases.265 “Lower court judges who favor standing in data breach
cases” that do not involve actual financial losses might still conclude that the
increased risk of identity theft resulting from such breaches is sufficient to
“constitute both a concrete and a particularized injury.”266 The Spokeo decision did not directly address and leaves open the question of whether a data
breach without any financial losses constitutes a concrete injury for Article III
standing.

258 Id. at 1554–56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
259 Id. at 1550.
260 Id. at 1549.
261 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
262 Bradford C. Mank, The Supreme Court’s Decision and Remand in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins
Postpones the Difficult Standing Issues in Statutory Standing and Identity Theft Cases, CASETEXT
(May 16, 2016), https://casetext.com/posts/the-supreme-courts-decision-and-remand-inspokeo-inc-v-robins-postpones-the-difficult-standing-issues-in-statutory-standing-and-identity-theft-cases.
263 Id.
264 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549.
265 Mank, supra note 262.
266 Id.
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The Eighth Circuit’s Divided Decision in Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc.

In Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc.,267 a divided three-judge panel of the
Eighth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s Robins decision and held that a
plaintiff may meet Article III standing requirements by alleging a willful violation of his individual statutory rights under a provision of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA)268 and seeking statutory damages
under the FCRA’s liability provision,269 without a showing of actual damages
from a defendant’s allegedly willful violation of his rights under FACTA.270
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Riley argued that the majority’s
“expansive reading of a single line” in the Supreme Court’s 1975 Warth decision was inconsistent with Clapper and several other post-1975 standing decisions.271 The disagreement between the majority and Chief Judge Riley is at
least partly due to the Court’s unclear standing jurisprudence.272
a.

Hammer’s Majority Opinion

In Hammer, two plaintiffs brought a putative class action on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated,
alleg[ing] that Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Sam’s East, Inc., and Sam’s West, Inc.
(collectively “Sam’s Club”) willfully violated a provision of [FACTA], which
prohibits a person accepting credit or debit cards for a consumer transaction
from “print[ing] more than the last five digits of the card number . . . upon
any receipt provided to the cardholder.”273

Despite its conclusion that Sam’s Club violated FACTA, the district court
granted Sam’s Club’s motion for summary judgment dismissal on the ground
that the violation was not willful because Sam’s Club had printed only the last
four digits of the credit card number on the receipt.274 The district court
and then the Eighth Circuit both concluded that Sam’s Club’s practice of
printing the last ten digits of the member’s identification number on his
receipt, and using the full twelve digits for that identification as the member’s credit card number if the member used a Sam’s Club Private Label
Credit Card, was a violation of FACTA, but not a willful violation of the statute because the statute was sufficiently ambiguous about whether the fivedigit rule applied to membership numbers such that Sam Club’s interpreta267 754 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 2014).
268 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2012).
269 Id. § 1681n(a)–(n)(a)(1)(A) (“the FCRA liability provision”) (“Any person who willfully fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to
any consumer is liable to that consumer in an amount equal to the sum of . . . any actual
damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure or damages of not less than
$100 and not more than $1,000 . . . .”).
270 Hammer, 754 F.3d at 498–501.
271 Id. at 504–08 (Riley, C.J., dissenting).
272 See infra subsection III.D.5.b.
273 Hammer, 754 F.3d at 495 (third and fourth alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1)).
274 Id. at 495–97, 501.
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tion was not objectively unreasonable.275 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s decision on the merits, but first concluded that the plaintiffs
had Article III standing to sue.276
Like the Ninth Circuit in Robins,277 the Eighth Circuit in Hammer relied
upon Warth for the principle that “[t]he actual or threatened injury required
by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.”278 Judge Bright’s majority opinion broadly
interpreted the statutory standing principle in Warth, stating: “Notably, this
language is without limitation: the actual-injury requirement may be satisfied
solely by the invasion of a legal right that Congress created.”279 Like Judge
Sutton in the Beaudry decision,280 the Eighth Circuit in Hammer cited the
Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Havens Realty Corp. as precedent for the
proposition that a statutory violation may constitute an Article III standing
injury in the absence of an actual injury to an individual.281 Responding to
Judge Riley’s dissenting opinion argument that Warth had been effectively
narrowed or overruled by subsequent Supreme Court precedent, Judge
Bright’s majority opinion responded:
[I]t bears repeating that to our knowledge, every federal circuit court of
appeals to have addressed whether a plaintiff is permitted to recover statutory damages under the FCRA liability provision in the absence of actual
damages has answered in the affirmative. Moreover, not one of these courts
has concluded that the FCRA liability provision violates constitutional standing principles. Federal jurisprudence supports our holding with respect to
Article III standing.282

Because Congress in the FCRA gave consumers a legal right to a receipt
at the point of sale showing no more than five digits of a credit or debit card
number, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Sam’s Club’s printing of more
than five numbers on the receipt constituted an actual standing injury in
violation of the statute, and, therefore, that the plaintiffs had Article III
standing to sue.283 Judge Bright acknowledged that standing precedent
275 Id. at 501–03. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Riley argued that the statute
clearly applied to membership numbers, that several Sam’s Club employees had warned
that its practice of printing more than five digits of the membership number violated the
statute, and that a reasonable jury could decide that Sam’s Club had acted in reckless
disregard of its statutory duty. Id. at 510–13 (Riley, C.J., dissenting).
276 Id. at 497–501 (majority opinion).
277 See supra subsection III.D.4.
278 Hammer, 754 F.3d at 498 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citation omitted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
279 Id.
280 See supra subsection III.A.2.
281 Hammer, 754 F.3d at 498 n.3 (“[A]n individual who receives false information in
violation of section 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act has standing to bring a claim regardless
of whether the violation results in actual injury to the individual.” (citing Havens Realty
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74 (1982))).
282 Id. at 501 n.4.
283 Id. at 498–99.
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required a personal injury for Article III standing, but he observed that the
plaintiffs met this requirement because each alleged that his personal
receipts contained excessive numbers in violation of the five-number rule in
the statute.284 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the liability
provision in the statute does not authorize suits by the public at large, but
requires a plaintiff to demonstrate an individual injury to sue, in accordance
with Article III standing.285 Accordingly, the Hammer decision held,
“Because appellants allege that they have suffered an actual, individualized
invasion of a statutory right, we conclude that they have satisfied the injury-infact requirement of Article III standing.”286
Next, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the plaintiffs’ alleged injury
was redressable by a favorable court decision, and particularly whether the
plaintiffs were entitled to statutory damages in the absence of an actual
injury.287 Because the FCRA liability provision alternatively and disjunctively
provides that a plaintiff may recover “any actual damages . . . or damages of
not less than $100 and not more than $1,000,”288 the Hammer decision concluded that a plaintiff may recover statutory damages of between $100 and
$1000, even in the absence of any actual damages.289 Furthermore, Judge
Bright reasoned that allowing a plaintiff to recover statutory damages under
the FCRA even in the absence of an actual injury was “consistent with the
purpose of FACTA’s receipt requirement” in preventing identity theft by forbidding the printing of more than the last five digits of a card number on a
receipt because Congress was aware that it would be difficult in many cases of
such violations to prove actual damages.290 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit’s
interpretation that the FCRA allowed statutory damages in the absence of
proof of actual damages was supported by the Sixth Circuit’s Beaudry decision
and similar decisions in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits.291 In particular, the
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Robins held that a plaintiff alleging a violation of
his personal statutory rights under the FCRA met Article III standing requirements and was entitled to statutory damages without showing any actual damages.292 Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs could recover
284 Id. at 499.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 499–500.
288 Id. at 499 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (2012)).
289 Id. at 500.
290 Id.
291 Id. (first citing Bateman v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 719 (9th Cir.
2010) (“Congress expressly created a statutory damages scheme that intended to compensate individuals for actual or potential damages resulting from FACTA violations, without
requiring individuals to prove actual harm.”); then citing Beaudry v. TeleCheck Servs.,
Inc., 579 F.3d 702, 705 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that “‘actual damages’ represent an alternative form of relief” under 15 U.S.C. § 1681n and that “the statute permits a recovery
when there are no identifiable or measurable actual damages”); and then citing Murray v.
GMAC Mortg. Corp., 434 F.3d 948, 953 (7th Cir. 2006)).
292 Id. (citing Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413–14 (9th Cir. 2014)).
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statutory damages in “the absence of a claim for actual damages,” and that
they met Article III standing requirements.293
b.

Chief Judge Riley’s Dissenting Opinion

In his dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Riley argued that the plaintiffs did
not have Article III standing because they presented no allegations or evidence that the receipts containing their credit card information were at risk
of theft by identity thieves.294 While acknowledging that Sam’s Club had
committed a violation of FACTA’s receipt requirement by showing more
than the consumer’s last five credit or debit card numbers, he contended
that “this trivial statutory violation” did not constitute an injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing because no harm resulted to the plaintiffs from
the violation.295 Chief Judge Riley cited a legal dictionary and two federal
courts of appeals decisions for the proposition that American civil law had
historically required a plaintiff to prove he suffered an actual harm to recover
monetary compensation in a suit, and then he reasoned the Supreme Court’s
injury-in-fact requirement for standing “incorporates this traditional
principle.”296
Chief Judge Riley criticized the majority opinion for relying upon “an
extraordinarily broad reading of the Supreme Court’s 1975 dictum in Warth
that ‘[t]he actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by
virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.’ ”297 He contended that the majority’s view that a plaintiff may have
standing for a statutory violation without an actual injury “[i]gnor[ed] the
last thirty-nine years of Article III standing jurisprudence” since the Warth
decision and that the “Supreme Court has never actually held an unharmed
plaintiff had standing by virtue of a bare statutory violation.”298 Since the
Warth decision in 1975, Chief Judge Riley argued that the Court has limited
Article III standing by “strongly suggest[ing] that to have a case under Article
III, a plaintiff must have suffered not only the violation of a legal right (the
‘injury’ of ‘injury in fact’), but also a factual harm (the ‘in fact’).”299 As I will
293 Id. at 500.
294 Id. at 504 (Riley, C.J., dissenting).
295 Id.
296 Id. (citing Injuria Absque Damno, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining
injuria absque damno)). “It is a longstanding principle in civil law that there can be no
monetary recovery unless the plaintiff has suffered harm.” Mira v. Nuclear Measurements
Corp., 107 F.3d 466, 473 (7th Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d
416, 435 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[I]njury without damage creates no right to compensation.”).
297 Hammer, 754 F.3d at 505 (Riley, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 498 (majority opinion)).
298 Id. (footnote omitted).
299 Id. at 505–06 (first citing Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (“The plaintiff must have suffered or be imminently threatened
with a concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact.’”); then quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 155 (2010) (“Such harms . . . are sufficiently concrete to
satisfy the injury-in-fact prong of the constitutional standing analysis.” (emphasis added by
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argue below, even if Chief Judge Riley’s interpretation of precedent is accurate, the Supreme Court has created confusion for the lower federal courts
by “strongly suggest[ing]” an actual injury requirement for standing rather
than providing a clear holding that binds lower court judges.300
In particular, Chief Judge Riley contended that the majority’s broad
reading of the Warth decision was inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
“narrow” reading of that case in its 1992 decision Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.301 He interpreted Lujan’s statement that Congress may “elevat[e] to the
status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law” to mean that Congress may only create a statutory
remedy for a de facto harm, or in other words, an actual harm.302 Chief
Judge Riley maintained that “[w]hether Congress can create justiciable injuries where there is no real harm presents an extremely difficult constitutional
question” and that “[i]t is a question the Supreme Court has never
answered.”303 He questioned whether the majority’s approach of allowing
statutory violations to constitute a standing injury in the absence of an actual
injury was inconsistent with the “Supreme Court’s carefully crafted injury in
fact jurisprudence.”304 Chief Judge Riley argued that the majority should
have avoided the difficult issue of whether a standing injury may ever be recognized without an actual injury by interpreting the statute to require a plaintiff to demonstrate some amount of actual damages.305
c.

In Braitberg v. Charter Communications, Inc., the Eighth Circuit
Rejects the Absolutist Approach to Statutory Standing in
Hammer

In its 2016 decision Braitberg v. Charter Communications, Inc., the Eighth
Circuit interpreted the Spokeo decision as rejecting the absolutist approach to
statutory standing in Hammer.306 In the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri–St. Louis, plaintiff Alex Braitberg sued defendant
Charter Communications, Inc., alleging that Charter retained his personally
identifiable information in violation of a section of the Cable Communications Policy Act.307 The plaintiff relied upon the Eighth Circuit’s Hammer
Chief Judge Riley)); then quoting Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000) (defining “injury in fact” as “a harm that is both ‘concrete’ and
‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical’” (emphasis added by Chief Judge
Riley)); and then quoting Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)
(“[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has found ‘injury in fact.’”
(emphasis added by Chief Judge Riley))).
300 See id. at 505; infra subsection III.D.5.b.
301 Hammer, 754 F.3d at 506 (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578
(1992)).
302 Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578).
303 Id.
304 Id. at 507–08.
305 Id. at 508–10.
306 836 F.3d 925, 930 (8th Cir. 2016).
307 Id. at 926 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 551(e) (2012)).
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decision for the proposition that a violation of a statutory right creates an
injury in fact that is sufficient in itself to establish standing under Article
III.308 Accordingly, Braitberg argued that there is no requirement for him to
allege or demonstrate an “actual injury” arising from Charter’s retention of
his personal information.309 However, the district court dismissed the case
for lack of Article III standing and the plaintiff appealed to the Eighth
Circuit.310
The Eighth Circuit heard oral argument in Braitberg and then held the
case pending a decision by the Supreme Court in Spokeo.311 The Eighth Circuit concluded that Braitberg would have had standing under Hammer’s
absolutist position that any procedural violation of a federal statute is sufficient for Article III standing.312 However, the Eighth Circuit determined
that the Supreme Court’s Spokeo decision “rejected this absolute view [of statutory standing] and superseded [its] precedent in Hammer.”313 In Braitberg,
the Eighth Circuit interpreted the Spokeo decision as requiring a plaintiff to
demonstrate some type of concrete injury even for statutory injuries,
although acknowledging that Congress may recognize intangible statutory
injuries.314 Congress may give plaintiffs the right to sue if the government
fails to provide them with certain information that Congress has decided to
make public.315 However, the Eighth Circuit read the Spokeo decision as barring a mere procedural violation such as an incorrect zip code from establishing statutory standing.316 The Eighth Circuit held that Braitberg’s allegation
of a bare procedural violation failed to meet the Spokeo decision’s approach
to statutory standing, and that he failed to establish any statutory injury.317
The Eighth Circuit’s rejection of statutory standing for bare procedural injuries in Braitberg does not resolve identity theft claims such as the Seventh
Circuit’s Remijas decision where there is a heightened risk of economic
injury.318
CONCLUSION
Because of the split in the lower courts over whether people whose personal data has been stolen by computer hackers have Article III standing to
308 Id. at 930.
309 Id.
310 Id. at 927.
311 Id.
312 Id. at 930 (citing Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., 754 F.3d 492, 498–99 (8th Cir. 2014)).
313 Id.
314 Id. (citing Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)).
315 Id. (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549–50); see Bradford C. Mank, The Supreme Court
Acknowledges Congress’ Authority to Confer Informational Standing in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 94
WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2833032.
316 Braitberg, 836 F.3d at 930 (citing Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550).
317 Id. at 930–31.
318 See supra Section III.D.
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sue retailers or employers who failed to protect the data of consumers or
employees,319 the Supreme Court needs to address this important issue.
Unfortunately, the Court’s standing jurisprudence is complicated and sometimes contradictory.320 For example, the Clapper decision used a strict “certainly impending” standing test, but also acknowledged that the Court had in
some cases applied a less strict “substantial risk” standing standard.321 The
Court recently adopted a more lenient approach to standing in Susan B.
Anthony,322 and some lower court decisions granting standing in data breach
cases have followed that decision or invoked the Clapper decision’s alternative
“substantial risk” standing standard.323 In Spokeo v. Robins, the Supreme
Court did not resolve the question of whether and under what circumstances
Congress may grant Article III standing through a statute, other than to
reject an additional harm requirement.324 Thus, Spokeo left open the question of whether a data breach that merely increases a plaintiff’s risk of identity theft is a sufficiently concrete risk to justify Article III standing.325
While it is difficult to predict how the Court will decide Article III standing issues in data breach cases, a recent Fourth Amendment decision holding
that police officers may not search an arrested criminal suspect’s cell phone
without first obtaining a search warrant demonstrates that the Supreme
Court is concerned with protecting the digital data of Americans.326 In Riley
v. California,327 police officers, in two separate cases that were later consolidated into one appeal before the Court, had seized a cell phone from each
arrested suspect, and then used digital information on the cell phone as evidence leading to a criminal conviction.328 While prior decisions had allowed
police to seize physical objects on the person of arrested subjects without a
search warrant to protect the safety of police and to preserve evidence,329
Chief Justice Roberts in a unanimous decision330 held that police may not
seize the potentially “vast quantities of personal information” stored on cell
phones without first obtaining a search warrant.331 First, he reasoned that

319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
Id. at
331

See supra Part III.
See supra Parts I, II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part II.
See supra Section III.D.
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 (2016).
Mank, supra note 262.
Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
Id.
Id. at 2480–82.
Id. at 2482–85.
Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
2495–98 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 2485–95 (opinion of the Court).
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the “[d]igital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to
harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape.”332
The Court next addressed the balance between the government’s interests in searching arrested persons and the privacy concerns of the arrestee.333
The Riley decision concluded that the potentially vast amounts of information stored on modern cell phones raised far more important privacy concerns than prior cases allowing police to seize physical objects from an
arrestee without a warrant, and that, accordingly, police must obtain a warrant to seize the digital data on a cell phone.334 After observing that the
digital data associated with a cell phone is sometimes actually stored in a
“cloud computer” connected to the phone through the internet, the Court
concluded that both data actually on the phone itself and data stored
remotely is equally protected by the privacy concerns of the Fourth
Amendment.335
In an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito agreed with the majority’s holding that police must obtain a warrant before seizing the digital data stored on an arrestee’s cell phone.336
Because “[m]any cell phones now in use are capable of storing and accessing
a quantity of information, some highly personal, that no person would ever
have had on his person in hard-copy form,” he acknowledged the need “for a
new balancing of law enforcement and privacy interests.”337 However, he
suggested that Congress or state legislatures should enact statutes that balance the privacy of cell phone users against law enforcement concerns,
rather than rely on the efforts of federal courts to do such balancing through
the Fourth Amendment.338
Justice Alito’s approach of recommending legislative rather than judicial
solutions for cell phone users would also be helpful in the context of establishing liability rules for data breaches. There is no comprehensive federal
statute addressing data breaches.339 The FCRA and other federal statutes do
not provide clear rules for liability in data breach cases, which explains in
part the division in the lower courts addressing data breach issues.340 Unfortunately, disagreements between Republicans and Democrats in Congress
have blocked proposed federal legislation addressing data breach issues, and
some recent proposals in Congress would arguably provide weaker remedies
than some plaintiffs have won in suits involving a variety of common law or
332 Id. at 2485. Next, the Court addressed how police officers might secure a phone to
prevent another person from wiping out or encrypting the digital data from a remote
location. Id. at 2486–88.
333 Id. at 2488–91.
334 Id. at 2494–95.
335 Id. at 2491.
336 Id. at 2495–98 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
337 Id. at 2496–97.
338 Id. at 2497–98.
339 Peters, supra note 6, at 1177–83 (discussing several federal and state statutes relevant to victims of data breaches).
340 See supra Part III.
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indirect statutory remedies.341 In 2014, Congress passed legislation that
should improve data security in federal agencies, but these bills have no
application to the private sector.342
There are several ways new federal data breach legislation could provide
better remedies and lessen the risk of such breaches, and also balance the
needs of consumers for privacy protection without overly burdening companies that cannot prevent all possible hacking of data in the internet age, but
enacting legislation in Congress remains a challenge.343 For example, a legislature might limit a plaintiff’s recovery to the cost of credit monitoring services and any actual expenses incurred by a plaintiff as a result of a data
breach.344 Some states have enacted or considered legislation that limits the
amount of time retailers can retain payment card data to forty-eight hours
and allows financial companies to sue merchant companies that fail to comply.345 This type of legislation should reduce the risk of future data
breaches, although no proposal can assure complete security.346
If comprehensive legislative solutions are unlikely in the near future,
federal courts should at least consider recognizing standing for plaintiffs in
data breach cases where there is a significant potential for misuse of stolen
data because such plaintiffs face significant harms from disclosure of their
data even if they cannot prove that someone has already misused that data.
The Riley decision involves Fourth Amendment warrant issues that are not
relevant to private data breach suits.347 Yet in both cell phone seizure cases
and data breach suits, there is the common denominator that vast amounts
of personal data are often at stake in a way that would have not been as true
in a pre-digital age where an individual’s data might have been scattered in
dozens of file cabinets filled with paper.348 The Riley decision could indirectly undermine the traditional view that consumers have little or no expectation of privacy in information that they voluntarily transfer to a second
341 Peters, supra note 6, at 1194–96 (discussing and criticizing the proposed Data Security & Breach Notification Act of 2013, S. 1193, 113th Cong. (2013)).
342 Evan M. Wooten, The State of Data-Breach Litigation and Enforcement: Before the 2013
Mega Breaches and Beyond, 24 J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SEC. ST. B. CAL. 229,
238–39 (2015) (listing five 2014 federal statutes addressing only data security for the federal government).
343 Peters, supra note 6, at 1194–1202 (proposing several legislative solutions involving
private rights of action, insurance, and government regulation “to minimize the occurrence of data breaches and to provide consumers with a remedy when data breaches do
occur,” but acknowledging political barriers in Congress to enacting data breach
legislation).
344 Rubow, supra note 3, at 1034–35 (citing Patricia Cave, Note, Giving Consumers a Leg
to Stand On: Finding Plaintiffs a Legislative Solution to the Barrier from Federal Courts in Data
Security Breach Suits, 62 CATH. U. L. Rev. 765, 793 (2013)).
345 Kim, supra note 19, at 586.
346 Id. at 586–87.
347 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485–95 (2014) (discussing the privacy concerns of arrestees in the context of the Fourth Amendment).
348 See id. at 2489–95 (discussing the vast amounts of data stored in the current digital
age compared to the pre-digital age).
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party who then voluntarily or involuntarily conveys that information to a
third party.349 Courts should recognize privacy as a public good that
deserves protection when defendants harm others by failing to protect their
personal information.350
These new privacy concerns in a digital age should lead the Supreme
Court to take a broader view of standing in at least some data breach cases
than it did in the Clapper decision.351 One must concede that the Clapper
decision did not give much weight to privacy concerns, but that decision was
different from private data breach cases because it involved the special context of government intelligence gathering.352 It is possible that the Supreme
Court’s nine Justices might take a more liberal view of standing in data
breach cases than in the Clapper decision because they could be personally
affected by data breaches someday, just as their familiarity with the vast
amounts of personal data stored on cell phones arguably affected their decision in Riley.353
If the Supreme Court does not address data breach standing, some
courts will continue to interpret Clapper to bar all claims where a plaintiff
only alleges possible future harms, but no current injury from the breach.354
Some courts will rely on the substantial risk footnote in Clapper and the Susan
B. Anthony decision to allow data breach suits based on future harms.355
Other decisions will rely on the Seventh Circuit’s Remijas decision to distinguish Clapper where some of the plaintiffs have suffered actual harms, on the
grounds that in such cases other plaintiffs are at increased risk compared to
cases where no one has suffered an actual theft of property.356 The Seventh
Circuit’s Remijas decision’s distinction between cases where there is only a
possible risk of theft and cases where actual harm has occurred to some

349 Lamparello, supra note 3, at 123–24.
350 Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385,
387–96 (2015) (arguing that current legal doctrine fails to recognize privacy as a public
good and therefore under-protects individual and group privacy interests).
351 See generally Andy Greenberg, Why the Supreme Court May Finally Protect Your Privacy in
the Cloud, WIRED (June 26, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/06/why-the-supreme-courtmay-finally-protect-your-privacy-in-the-cloud/ (arguing that the Riley v. California decision
protecting the digital data of arrestees “could also signal a shift in how the Court sees the
privacy of data in general—not just when it’s stored on your physical handset, but also
when it’s kept somewhere far more vulnerable: in the servers of faraway Internet and
phone companies,” but focusing on governmental data collecting rather than private data
breaches).
352 See supra Part II.
353 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489–95 (discussing the vast amounts of personal data stored
on cell phones).
354 See supra Section III.C.
355 See supra Part II, Section III.D.
356 See supra Section III.D.
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plaintiffs is probably the best way to decide whether there is a substantial risk
of identity theft for plaintiffs until Congress is able to pass comprehensive
legislation in this area.357

357 See Biglow, supra note 19, at 967–69, 972–73, 975 (arguing that courts should follow
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Remijas, which found Article III standing where some
persons had already been harmed by a data breach and remaining plaintiffs were therefore
at a significantly increased risk of harm, rather than the Third Circuit’s decision in Reilly,
which denied standing in a data breach case with no apparent actual injuries); supra Section III.D, Conclusion.
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